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Feminism may pose the opportunity to conceptualize and nourish 
another, emancipatory side of power, a side that expands our horizons 
rather than curtails them, a side that nurtures our personhood rather than 
stultifies it, a side that fosters care for our inherent human dignity rather 
than inflaming· the festering sores of "anxious privitism"216 and possessive 
individualism. 217 Feminism, rather than working within and thereby 
reproducing the androcentric interpretation/imposition of power, may be 
able to challenge the very meaning of power itself. Difference, with its 
substantive emphasis on the ethic of care, may fit with this alternative 
conception of power. 
However, because of her unidimensional conception of power, 
MacKinnon understands "difference" as "powerlessness" rather than 
"power to".218 Although MacKinnon is correct to point out that, 
historically, the awareness of difference has operated to women's 
disadvantage, and that women's caring role has been part of their strategy 
for survival, we must be careful not to make this into an essentialist thesis 
that difference = domination/subordination. Such an approach ignores 
the factor of human - particularly male - agency in making this 
correlation. But, again, what has been socially constructed by males is 
capable of being ( de )reconstructed by females and profeminist males. 
Difference can be interpreted, codified and understood as being 
affirmative; the important question is how? MacKinnon, therefore, may 
have failed to challenge male supremacism at its core. Rather than 
attempting to reconstruct power, she takes the male interpretation to be 
the sole interpretation, thereby working within the paradigm, rather than 
transforming it. 
This may also lead her into the dangers of ahistoricism in that her 
conception of the totalizing dualistic hierarchy of male/female prohibits 
her from accounting for those women, herself included,219 who have 
managed to resist the pervasiveness of patriarchal ideology and who have 
voiced their opposition. Moreover, historically, some women have had 
access to power in both its androcentric and expansionist manifestations. 
Examples can be found not only in law, but also in politics and 
literature.220 There is a herstory that cannot be reduced to subordina-
216. Gabel, Book Review, R. Dworkin, "Taking Rights Seriously" (1978), 91 Harvard 
L.Rev. 302. 
217. C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (1962). 
218. The closest she comes to discussing "power to" is her assertions that "female power" is 
a "contradiction in terms", a "misnomer". Feminism Unmodified at 53. 
219. Thus, for example, at one point she posits that she is "existentially amazed" to be 
speaking at all. Feminism Unmodified at 163. 
220. Tori! Moi, supra note 2 at 64; Duchen, supra note 81 at 92. Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo, 
"Women, Culture and Society: A Theoretical Overview" supra note 4 at 17-42. In politics, see 
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tion.221 MacKinnon's conception of power is too all encompassing, it is 
an understanding which is underdeveloped for the explanatory burden it 
is required to carry. 
Ultimately, I fear that MacKinnon comes perilously close to 
reductionism by developing a unidimensional explanation that is 
monoliihic, thereby denying differences, important differences, not only 
Dorothy Smith, "The Problem of the Main Business", discussing the power of Chilean women, 
in the face of circumstances significantly harsher than those which face many North American 
women; Elizabeth Janeway, Powers of the Weak (1980). Ann Duffy, "Power" supra note 210 
discussing the powerful influence of a variety of middle and upper class Canadian Women in 
the Canadian culture and polity. See also Susan Ostrander in the American context, "Upper­
class Women: Class Consciousness as Conduct and Meaning" in Power Structure Research 73-
96 (G.W. Domhoff ed. 1980). 
See also N.C. Oye, As Sisters and As Equals (1980); J. White, Women and Unions (1980); 
R. Cavendish, Women on the Line (1982); J. Wajeman, Women in Control· Dilemmas of a 
Workers Co-operative (1983) M. Ryan, "The Power of Women's Networks: A Case Study of 
Female Moral Reform in Antebellum America" (1979), 5 Feminist Studies 66. Veronica 
Strong-Boag, The Parliament of Women: The National Council of Women of Canada 1893-
1929 (1976); M. Stacey and M. Price, Women, Power and Politics (1981); M. Young and P. 
Willmolt, Family and Kinship in East London (1962); B. Campbell, Wigam Pier Revisited 
(1984); C. Smith Rosenberg, "The Female World of Love and Ritual: Relations Between 
Women in Nineteenth Century America" (1975), l Signs 1; E. Dubois et al., "Politics and 
Culture in Women's History: A Symposium" (1980), 6 Feminist Studies 26. 
Again, if we look beyond our own cultures there is some evidence· to indicate that women 
do exercise power. For overviews see Joyce Neilsen, "From Corrective to Creative Progress in 
Sex Stratification: Sociological and Anthropoligical Contributions" (1979), 2 International 
Journal of Women's Studies 324; Sharon Tiffany, "Women, Power and the Anthropology of 
Politics: A Review" (1979), 2 International Journal of Women's Studies 430. V. Mahler, 
"Work, Consumption and Authority within the Household: A Morrocan Case" in Of Marriage 
and the Market 69 (K. Young ed. 1981); A. Hamilton, "A Complex Strategical Situation: 
Gender and Power in Aboriginal Australia", in Australian Women: Feminist Perspectives (N. 
Grieve and P. Grimshaw eds. 1981). Black herstory has been particularly important in 
illuminating the narrowness of"women as only victim" analysis. See Audre Lorde, "An Open 
Letter to Mary Daly" in This Bridge Called Me Back, supra note 69, at 94; Alice Walker, In 
Search of Our Mothers Gardens: Womanist Prose ( 1983); Carol Stack, All Our Kin: Strategies 
for Survival in Black Communities (1975); Angela Davis, Women, Race and Class (1981). In 
the area of legal relations, Shelley Gavigan suggests that there exists an as yet unrecounted 
history of women's powerful resistance to masculinist law, "Bringing on the Menses: The 
Criminal Liability of Women and the Therapeutic Exception in Canadian Abortion Law" 
(1986), 1 Can. J.W.L. 279. 
221. MacKinnon would possibly portray this discussion as an example of the male response 
in which "the success of our (women's) survival is used to delegitimize what we have survived 
to say, our critique", Feminism Unmodified at 131. Such a criticism would miss the point of 
my suggestion for I am not claiming that things aren't bad for women, rather it is that the 
oppression is not total. Moreover, MacKinnon's reliance on survival is an inadequate 
foundation upon which to priorize her interpretation and critique . . . other women who 
disagree with MacKinnon are also survivors. To disagree is not necessarily to delegitimize. 
I think that elements of a better approach are contained, in an earlier claim by MacKinnon 
that, ". . . feminism relies on the ultimate possibility of resistence, even though the feminist 
analysis of the crushing totality of subordination has difficulty accounting for it." "Toward 
Feminist Jurisprudence" (1982), 34 Stanford L.Rev. 703, 720. Although she tends to still 
overplay the domination element, there is an awareness that women have a power to resist. 
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inter-gender but also intra-gender. It renders "her impervious to the 
nuances, inconsistencies and ambiguities"222 of social interaction. If we 
accept MacKinnon's "metaphysically nearly perfect" approach, how do 
we explain what Adrienne Rich has described as "the extraordinary will­
to-survive in millions of obscure women",223 that the gynocide has not 
already taken place, that the Atwoodian dystopia224 is not where we are 
today. If women have been the victims of such universal and unrelenting 
domination and misogyny (which is a different claim from pervasive and 
systemic inequality) then how has womankind survived and, more 
importantly, how is feminism now able to articulate its critique of male 
hegemony. How does feminism know? I suggest that, at least in part, this 
is due to a nascent counterparadigm of power, a resilient, supportive, 
encouraging, expansive and deviationist subpower that has allowed the 
community of women· to continue despite an extremely adverse political 
ecology.225 
Finally, not only does her approach run the risk of falsifying the past, 
more depressing still, it may also foreclose a feminist future. Her 
approach is pervaded by a politically paralysing negativity, that denies 
the emancipatory potential of difference, by claiming that we cannot 
know what women would say or write or do because the foot is on the 
throat.226 Though metaphorically powerful, and marvellously capturing, 
222. Tori! Moi, supra note 2 at 30. 
223. On Lies, Secrets and Silence 255 (1979). See also Kalpana Ram, "Sexual Violence in 
India" (1982), Refractory Girl 2. 
224. Margaret Atwood, The Handmaid's Tale (1985). 
225. A cautious parallel may be drawn here between the position of women in patriarchal 
society and black slaves in antebellum America. For a long time many scholars emphasized the 
repression and damage caused to black people by slavery. However, without underplaying or 
denying the horrendous nature of the system of slavery, black and radical scholars in the 1970's 
also highlighted not only the incredible resistence of black people but also the richness and 
beauty of their culture even in these times. See, for example, Eugene Genovese, Roll Jordan 
Roll· The World the Slaves Made (1974); Herbert Gutman, The Invisible Fact: Afro-Americans 
and their Families 1750-1925 (1972). 
226. Feminism Unmodified at 30. MacKinnon is aware of this to some extent. In concluding 
an address in honour of two women judges she opines, 
If it seems that this ( discussion of feminist loyalties) is not very concrete, I think it is 
because we have no idea what women as women would have to say. I'm evoking for 
women a role that we have yet to make, in the name of a voice that, unsilenced, might 
say something that has never been heard. 
Unwilling to leave her audience with such an ungraspable thought she concludes, 
I will hazard a little bit about its content. In the legal world of win and lose, where 
success is measured by other people's failures, in this world of kicking and getting 
kicked, I want to say: there is another way. Women who refuse to forget the way 
women everywhere are treated everyday, who refuse to forget that that is the meaning 
of being a woman, no matter how secure they might feel in having temporarily escaped 
it, women as women will find that way, (Feminism Unmodified at 77). 
MacKinnon wants to speak of how things could be otherwise and yet appears unable to find 
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in one pithy phrase, the patriarchal nature of contemporary social 
relations, I think that this may go too far in its relentless rhetorical 
reductionism.227 Rather than being empowering, MacKinnon's may be a 
jurisprudence of despondence.228 
Put differently, how are we to ever know when the foot is off the 
throat? How are we to know that MacKinnon's articles, speeches, 
legislation have any more credibility as the authentic, unmodified 
feminist voice than that of Cixous or Gilligan? By what criteria are 
feminists to evaluate their praxis if everything they do is a distorted 
gurgling caused by the rugged heel of masculinist supremacy?2:9 
Difference provides the possibility of establishing an affirmative - but 
fundamentally corrigible, and possibly only transitory - vision which 
can provide b�th a concrete alternative standpoint from which to critique 
masculinist hegemony as well as suggesting a positive direction for 
feminist practice and theory. Difference provides both a centre of 
resistance and a potential panorama - severely limited no doubt - to 
begin the process of transformation. It provides a gap in which to 
articulate an alternative normative order. Simple critique and negation 
of everything masculine is not enough . . . it is trashing but not 
reconstructing. Nor is it adequate to say that feminists must wait until 
they have destroyed masculinist supremacy and gained access to power 
and then, and only then, wiil they begin to imagine what otherwise might 
mean . . .  feminism, I believe, must build as it goes. In my opinion, 
feminism must articulate, create and develop alternative - but corrigible 
- visions and practice that will concretize and tangibly inspire those 
who seek social transformation. The discourse of difference provides the 
the words. The "content" is frustrating rather than helpful because MacKinnon has already 
debarred herself from access to the discourse of difference, where at least the words "empathy", 
"care" or "solidarity" might help. 
227. Toril Moi, supra note 2 at 29. 
228. Indeed, when asked, "how do you maintain hope for future gains [for women]" 
MacKinnon replied, "I'm more into determination. I am agnostic on the subject of hope." 
Cited in Karst, "Women's Constitution" supra note 167 at 476, n. 113. 
229. Even more problematic still are McKinnon's suggestions that her feminism is the true 
feminism, that all others are complicit in collaborative with, male supremacy or, more 
benevolently, falsely conscious. See pp. 5, 49, 13, 198-205, 216-218. For example, in 
commenting on the female sexuality debate, she posits, 
I think that sexual desire in women, at least in this culture, is socially constructed as that 
by which we come to want our own self annihilation. That is, our subordination is 
eroticized in and as female, in fact, we get off on it to a degree, if nowhere near as much 
as men do. This is our stake in this system that is not in our interest, our stake in this 
system that is killing us. I'm saying femininity as we know it is how we come to want 
male dominance, which most emphatically is not in our interest. Such a critique of 
complicity .. . does not come from an individualistic theory. Feminism Unmodified 
at 54. 
See also "Standards of Sisterhood" Broadside 6 (Dec. 1985/86 vol. 7, no. 3). 
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opportunity for a politics with substance,230 a politics that refuses to 
succumb to the moral nihilism of our post-modern condition. 
If the preceding discussion of resistance and resilience has any validity, 
it helps to unearth the historically significant ways in which power, in its 
affirmative manifestations, has proved invaluable for women in general, 
and for feminism, as a movement, in particular. Moreover, the most 
recent wave of feminisms has developed a praxis that incorporates at least 
some values associated with the ethic of care, and is itself a specific 
materialization of "power to": consciousness-raising. 
There appears to be consensus among feminists that, whatever its 
weaknesses, consciousness-raising has been of pivotal significance in the 
emergence of contemporary feminism.231 In so far as it provided non­
hierarchical, open, s-qpportive fora for women to articulate their 
experiences of male domination, it allowed women to recognize their 
communality in isolation, the pervasiveness of patriarchy, and the 
potential for solidarity among women. It provided the participants with 
a new and critical understanding of their lives and roles, thereby 
reinforcing their self-worth, self-esteem and self-respect. As well as being 
a "therapeutic experience", consciousness-raising was also a "politicizing 
agent"232 and, as such, it laid the foundation for the transformation from 
powerlessness to partial empowerment, in large part, through its 
valorization of their perspective as women. Moreover, building on this 
foundation of mutuality, it provided support for the newly emergent 
feminist practices: individual and/ or collective, private and/ or public. As 
MacKinnon once opined in her earlier work, "consciousness-raising is 
(feminism's) quintessential expression",233 and, I suggest, the praxis it 
inspires is what makes it a cognate of "power to".234 
230. Indeed feminism can certainly learn something from marxism's failures on this point 
because at least one reason for the emergence of the totalitarian eastern bloc was the failure of 
Marx and his successors to develop a conception of post bourgeois society beyond vague 
predictions of nonalienated human interaction. See "On The Jewish Question: Early Writings 
of Karl Marx" (1964), T.B. Bottomore (ed.); The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 
1844. 
231. For discussions, see e.g., P. White, S. Goode, "The Small Group in Women's Liberation" 
in (1969), 1 Women: A Journal of Liberation 56; Pamela Allen, Free Space: A Perspective on 
the Small Group in Women's Liberation (1980); Barky, "Towards a Phenomenology of 
Feminist Consciousness" in Feminism and Philosophy, supra note 8; Nancy McWilliams, 
"Contemporary Feminism, Consciousness-Raising, and Changing Views of the Political" in 
Women in Politics 157 ( Jane Jacquette, ed. 1974); C. MacKinnon, "Agenda" supra note 5; S. 
Law, "Equality, Power and the Limits of Law" (1986), 95 Yale L. J. 1769, 1784-1786; K. 
Lahey, "Until Women Themselves Have Told All They Have To Tell . .. " (1985), 23 Osgoode 
Hall L.J. 519. 
232. McWilliams, ibid. note 5 at 164. 
233. "Agenda", supra note 146 at 535. 
234. It might be argued by some that consciousness-raising is appropriate for womens groups 
to communicate independent of the silencing presence of males, but that it is unsuited to a 
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If we expand our horizons beyond law, and shift our focus from power 
and politics as they have been traditionally - and narrowly -
understood, we can, once again, learn from literature. For example, there 
has been an influential, radical heritage in literary criticism - traces of 
which can be detected in Barthes, Kristeva, Benjamin235 and Stein236 that 
suggests an alternative conception of power based upon laughter. A 
particularly poignant example of this is to be found in Russian literary 
critic Mikhail Bakhtin's reinterpretation of Rabelais. Bakhtin argues that 
anger, even when justified, is only one of several possible transformative 
strategies available to us. He posits that the power of laughter can be just 
as subversive as anger, and points to the power of the carnival to 
delegitimize and topple the hierarchy of both church and state, and to 
obliterate wh�t had appeared to be inevitable differences and to highlight 
new, mutable ones.237 
In the same de-ranging vein, some of those who have been the victims 
of domination and oppression have dis-played their resistance by 
reclaiming, affirming and revalorizing that which has been used to 
oppress them. For example, feminists, invoking the power of naming, 
have claimed and reinterpreted "chauvinism", disconnecting it from its 
patriotic context, and canonizing it as one of feminism's pejorative 
superlatives. Similarly, much of the work of Mary Daly is an attempt to 
support the traditionally devalued recipients of labels such as "hag", 
"spinster", "witch" and "shrew".238 And again, at least in certain, and not 
necessarily feminist, circles, the use of the generic "he" and "man" are 
considered inappropriate while "chairperson" and "spokesperson" are 
accepted as both desirable and normal. Other oppressed communities 
larger transformative programme. Such an argument assumes that males are incapable of the 
intersubjective awareness required for such an experience. If, however, one subscribes to 
modernism, as I do, then there is hope that males can develop such abilities. There is, of course, 
the logistical problem of making consciousness raising effective on a larger level but it is not 
clear to me that this has any necessary connection with gender. 
235. See for example, 
The class struggle, which is always present to a historian influenced by Marx, is a fight 
for the crude and the material things without which no refined and spiritual things 
could exist. Nevertheless, it is not in the form of the spoils which fall to the victor that 
the latter make their presence felt in the class struggle. They manifest themselves in this 
struggle as courage, humour, cunning, and fortitude, 
Walter Benjamin, llluminations 254-55 (Hannah Arendt, ed. 1964). 
236. See e.g. , Jo Anna Isaak, "Gertrude Stein: The Revolutionary Power of a Woman's 
Laughter" in The Ruin of Representation and Modernist Art and Texts 93-123 ( 1986). 
237. M. Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World (1968). For further discussions see generally, R.M. 
Berrong, Rabelais and Bakhtin (1986); D.N. Losse, Rhetoric at Play: Rabelais and Social 
Eulogy (1980); D.M. Frame, Franrois Rabelais (1977); A.F. Chappell, The Enigma of 
Rabelais (1978). 
238. See for example, Gyn/Ecology ( 1979); Wickedery ( 1987). 
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have reappropriated and revalorized terms that have been overlaid with 
oppression. Some blacks now use "sweet nigger" and gays, "faggot", and 
lesbians, "dyke", affirmatively, supportively. 
In short, because there are no immutable essences, difference does not 
necessarily have to be identified with inferior, but rather the relative value 
will depend upon the circumstances of power - a concept that must be 
understood expansively, in order to account for important examples of 
resistance and partial reconstructions. 
b) MacKinnon 's Positive Vision: Equality 
MacKinnon is fully aware that the critique of male supremacism cannot, 
on its own, cause the decline of the masculinist empire, nor can it capture 
the potential of feminism for social transformation. Having rejected the 
discourse of difference she must articulate her own suggestions for post­
patriarchy. Feminism Unmodified suggests that feminist agenda must be 
located in the discourse and praxis of "equalitf'.239 
Feminism, "as a political movement for civil equality",240 seeks to 
"eradicate . . . gender hierarchy"241 and end "enforced subordination, 
limited options and social powerlessness - on the basis of sex, among 
other things".242 "Equality as anti-domination",243 is not the "abstract 
equality of liberalism'',244 is more than a demand for access to the "male 
world" and "male pursuits", although this is included. 
Feminism seeks to empower women in our own terms. To value what 
women have always done as well as to allow us to do everything else. We 
seek not only to be valued as who we are, but to have access to the 
definition of value itself. In this way our demand for access becomes also 
a demand for change. 245 
Thus, for MacKinnon, equality is something much more significant 
than liberalism's espousal of equal opportunity, which is itself a structural 
limitation. Feminism demands to participate in the valorization. process 
itself, to transform rather than merely reform. Equality as anti­
domination is not merely the opportunity to be the same as men, thereby 
maintaining maleness as the essential referent, 246 or even to reverse the 
hierarchy. Rather equality, by enabling women to participate in the 
valorization process, provides the opportunity to reconstruct the very 
239. Feminism Unmodified at 15. 
240. Feminism Unmodified at 206. 
241. Feminism Unmodified at 22. 
242. Feminism Unmodified at 22. 
243. Littleton, Reconstructing, supra note 79. 
244. Feminism Unmodified at 16. 
245. Feminism Unmodified at 22. 
246. Feminism Unmodified at 34; see also Minow, "Justice Engendered", supra note 135. 
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conditions of human interaction, male-determined conditions of 
domination and subordination, so that power is no longer identified with 
dominance. 247 
The claims that feminism aspires to the transformation of both equality 
and power are central to MacKinnon's work, but are unfortunately 
underdeveloped, mostly because they remain abstractly aspirational and 
experientially unsituated. Rephrased, how does she propose to transform 
equality and power relations? No answer is forthcoming. One is tempted 
to suggest the difference approach, 248 but we are prohibited from such a 
strategy because difference is a male determined ideology, false­
consciousness. But why is equality any less male determined than 
difference? Surely, it too has been one of the master's tools premised as 
it is on malepess being the benchmark. 249 As I understand MacKinnon, 
her response is that equality as anti-domination reconstructs equality to 
be different from its male conception of "sameness", it is a transformative 
vision of equality. But the question remains, how does this reconstruction 
come about? If "equality", itself traditionally male,250 can be remade by 
feminism, then why cannot "difference" also be a component in the 
transformational process, disconnected from being complicit in women's 
subordination, reconstructed to be pivotal in their emancipation. Indeed, 
it has the advantage over equality of providing some concrete, specific 
247. Feminism Unmodified at 23. 
248. This integrative approach is suggested by both Angela Miles supra note 21 and Colleen 
Sheppard supra note 14. As Sheppard pithily posits, "Equality thus requires the embracing of 
social diversity" supra note 14 at 200. See also Christine Littleton, who attempts to develop 
a conception of "equality as acceptance" where difference would be "costless", so that, 
difference between human beings, whether perceived or real, and whether biologically 
or socially based, should not be permitted to make a difference in the lived out equality 
of those persons, (Reconstructing supra, note 79 at 1284 ). 
She also points out, however, that she is not celebrating difference (at fn. 79). 
249. Moreover, equality itself may not push the challenge far enough. It comes dangerously 
close to petitioning androcentrism for fairness and justice and as such may ultimately be tied 
to paternalistic benevolence. Particularly poignant in this light is Canadian feminists' emphasis 
upon equality claims. In the course of the patriation process feminists successfully campaigned 
to have their equal rights entrenched in the Charter. However, the Meech Lake brotherly 
compact threatens to undercut the feminist successes achieved less than a decade ago. What the 
male state has granted, equal rights for women, it can also take away. See A.Z. Dobrowolsky, 
"Meech Lake" (unpublished manuscript); R.A. Samek, "Untrenching Fundamental Rights" 
(1982), 27 McGill L.J. 755. 
250. MacKinnon acknowledges as much, at least in so far as equality means sameness. See 
Feminism Unmodified at 34. As Ann Scales points out, "In this country, the engine of the 
struggle for equality has been aristotelian: Equality means to treat like persons alike, and unlike 
persons unlike" in "The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay" (1986), 95 Yale L.J. 
1373, 1374 (footnote omitted). See also Littleton, "Reconstructing", Introduction and Part 11, 
supra note 79, for an outline of the concerns about the feminist espousal of equality, given its 
"phallocentricity". 
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elements which can provide guidance - always corrigible - for the 
direction in which the transformation might go. 
Although MacKinnon's discussion of equality is disconcertingly under­
developed, we can develop a more specific understanding of her 
reconstructive vision if we leave the spheres of jurisprudence and law, 
and briefly discuss her reflections on sport.251 Indeed, the shift of focus 
may be more apparent than real for the parallels between male-stream 
law and sport may be very strong. 
MacKinnon argues that trad1tional approaches to women in the 
athletic community, have been based upon the gender-hierarchy 
paradigm, thereby inferiorizing, excluding, and disadvantaging women. 
She argues that liberal feminism's demand for equal opportunity and the 
termination of sex-role stereotyping is inadequate. 
An alternative, "radical feminist analysis"252 challenges the gender 
hierarchy system and, "moves to transform the meaning of athletics, of 
sport itself'.253 MacKinnon's view of the radical feminist perspective is 
that there is a need for much more than an opportunity "to play with the 
boys"254 for that would still allow the boys to determine the nature, 
norms and values of the sport.255 The radical feminist approach strives 
towards the "creation of a new standard, of a new vision of sport",256 one 
that encourages physical self-respect, autonomy, integrity and self­
possession. As a transformative vision it strives to break with the 
repressive stereotypes of femininity and masculinity, to open up new 
horizons. 
The discussion of the "revaluation of sport" from a feminist 
perspective is important, not just for its own sake but also because it is 
one of the few occasions when MacKinnon indicates more specifically 
what her positive vision may be. It is a rejection of objectification and 
subordination in order to allow women to experience their bodies "as if 
they are our own".257 It is a vision of autonomy, integrity, self-worth, and 
self-determination. Significantly, as MacKinnon is keen to point out, this 
is not the same as femininity, for that serves "the interests of men", 
whereas her vision serves the interests of women. 
Again the question arises, how are women able to experience and 
bring about this revaluation and reconstruction of sport? Ma�Kinnon 
writes in the present tense and shares her experience and that of other 
251. Feminism Unmodified Cb. X, "Women, Self-Possession and Sport". 
252. Feminism Unmodified at 118. 
253. Feminism Unmodified at 119. 
254. Feminism Unmodified at 120. 
255. Feminism Unmodified at 121. 
256. Feminism Unmodified at 123. 
257. Feminism Unmodified at 121. 
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women, thereby indicating that the radical feminist transformation is 
already happening, at least in certain limited spheres. However, if the 
power-hierarchy thesis is to hold, then such feminist "deviations" would 
be impossible. As an explanatory theory, although providing important 
insights, the power-hierarchy thesis goes too far. Perhaps it would be 
better to understand the feminist revaluation of sport as an aspect of 
"power to", power to affirm women's integrity, power to co-operate, 
power to have fun. Moreover, if women can remake sport, despite their 
"learned disability",258 then why can they not also remake difference, to 
disconnect it from its negative and subordinating manifestations to be a 
component in a radically transformative counterparadigm for social 
interaction. Furthermore, there is nothing in MacKinnon's desiderata of 
autonomy, i:q.tegrity, self-worth or self-determination that is necessarily 
anti-thetical to the ethic of care, for, as I have emphasized, the ethic of 
care is not self-sacrifice.259 On the contrary, as Jean Grimshaw points out, 
it is exactly these sorts of qualities that make "care and an understanding 
of others" effective, powerful. 260 
c) Reconciling MacKinnon and Gilligan 
Within the interdependence of mutual (non-dominant) differences lies that 
security which enables us to descend into the chaos of knowledge and 
return with true visions of our future, along with the concomitant power 
to effect those changes which can bring that future into being. Difference 
is that raw and powerful connection from which our personal power is 
forged. 
Audre Lorde261 
A careful reading of MacKinnon provides an opportunity to question just 
how wide the gap is between her viewpoint and that of Gilligan. 
Although she clearly favours the equalitarian position on the continuum 
of equality and difference,262 at other moments, more interstitially and 
less developed, she does suggest that women's value structures would be, 
and are even now, somewhat different from those of men. The discussion 
of sport is the clearest example. 
258. Feminism Unmodified at 120. 
259. It may also be worth noting that "self-determination, autonomy, integrity and self-worth" 
are notoriously nebulous terms, and may not take us far beyond "equality" in the quest for 
specificity. Moreover, MacKinnon does not tell us in what way these virtues have necessarily 
avoided the power-hierarchy thesis that determines her work. For example, surely all women 
politicans would claim that their careers, achievements and agendas are premised upon self­
determination, autonomy, dignity and self-worth, but one wonders if MacKinnon would agree 
that they have avoided patriarchal hegemony? 
260. Jean Grimshaw, Feminist Philosophers 183 (1986). 
261. Sister Outsider at 111-112. 
262. See infra. 
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MacKinnon's point of disagreement with Gilligan is that the latter 
identifies difference with gender. But this, perhaps, is a misunderstanding 
of Gilligan's thesis, which, as I have indicated, is explicit in its rejection 
not only of biological determinism, but also of the identification of gender 
with difference. Indeed, recognizing that the debate may be somewhat ., 
misplaced, and by shifting focus from the source or form of difference to 
its substance, we can see that there may be more common ground 
between MacKinnon and Gilligan than has hitherto been recognized. 
Indeed, at one point MacKinnon refers to the values articulated by 
Gilligan that contribute in the ethic of care: 
That does not mean that I throw out those values. Those are nice values; 
everyone should have them. I am not saying that taking these values 
seriously would not _transform discourse, which would be a good thing 
under any circumstance of gender.263 
MacKinnon not only accepts the desirability of such values, but also their 
pot�ntially transformative potential. Her criticism is that such values are 
identified with women.264 Gilligan rejects such a reductionism, and says 
more modestly that some women and some men share both value 
structures, although not necessarily in equal amounts. My suggestion is 
that both men and women can contribute to the ethic of care, that we 
should deprivitize it, and that we ought to consider it a legitimate concern 
for legal practice and theory. 
Having taken the detour through difference, we can begin to work 
towards an alternative political-moral discourse and practice based upon 
an ethic of care. Difference may provide a conceptual vantage point that 
can help us move towards an alternative social structure.265 
263. Discourse at 74-75. 
264. Discourse at 74-75. 
265. Moreover, difference if taken seriously, can allow for a dramatic expansion of autonomy, 
dignity and empowerment. As Audre Lorde suggests, 
Difference must not be merely tolerated, but seen as a fund of necessary polarities 
between which our creativity can spark like a dialectic, 
Sister Outsider, l l l ( 1986). 
As I have suggested, MacKinnon's proposition that the dominant ideology of masculinism 
is a consistent and unified whole is unidimensional. It inhibits her from identifying the nuances, 
gaps and exceptions to the dominant ideology. Difference is one such nuance or exception in 
the matrix of patriarchy. However if difference is understood in the bioh>gistic or essentialist 
manner, as sex determined, then difference itself accepts patriarchal dualisms. Difference can 
be developed as a counterprinciple to the formalistic reductionism of equalitarianism that 
assumes the white, middle-class male to be "the measure of all things", (Feminism Unmodified 
at 34). 
If difference is understood in its existential, multi-faceted heterogeneity then the nuances and 
exceptions become the normal, the expected and the accepted. Difference is then recognized 
to relate not only to gender, but also to race, class, sexual orientation, physical or mental 
abilities, age, etc. 
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d) Alternative locations for the ethic of care 
What is at stake in this transcendence is the negation of the exploiting and 
repressive values of patriarchal civilization. What is at stake is the negation 
of the values engendered and reproduced in a society of male domination. 
And such radical subversion of values can never be the mere by product 
of new social institutions. It must have its roots in the men and women 
who built the new institutions. 
Herbert Marcuse266 
As we have seen, the real problem for MacKinnon is not the ideal of the 
ethic of care, but rather her concern that difference is reduced to women. 
Gilligan's work has been heavily criticized for its dangerous propensity to 
reproduce and legitimize traditional masculinist stereotypes of femininity 
with its correlative passification and disempowerment of women. 
However, now that we have a stronger conception of what difference 
might mean, a substantive vision rather than the insubstantial invocation 
of otherness, an ideological transvaluation, it may be possible to trace 
elements of the ethic of care elsewhere than in women's biology or 
socially constructed roles. This article does not collapse a political-moral 
discourse into the biological, for that would be to reproduce patriarchy's 
propensity for stereotypical and repressive rolification. 
In recent years, an increasing number of male scholars in a variety of 
disciplines have also been tentatively moving towards the orbit of an 
ethic of care. For example, in the field of psychology, Joseph Pleck has 
The espousal of difference confronts, head on, the oppression of a value-structure that 
espouses an equality which demands that those who are different become different from that 
which they are if they wish to be successful. In order that they be socially recognized and 
valued, it demands the very negation of that which makes them who and what they are. It 
assumes the legitimacy of structure which is systematically weighted in favour of a particular 
community by portraying it is "neutral", "necessary" or "natural" and insisting that people 
change - deny themselves - to fit, reinforce and ultimately perpetuate the structure. Thus, 
the community is constructed to fit the elite benefitting structure, rather than the social 
structure being transformed to facilitate, encourage and empower the plurality of diverse 
communities that characterize our societies. 
In this light, Canada may have a potentially significant adva11tage over the United States in 
that Canadians recognize cultural plurality as both desirable and worthy of state support. With 
regards to ethnicity, Canada encourages the vision of a society as a cultural mosaic, whereas 
the United States prefers the melting pot. Of course, Canada is still governed by w.a.s.p. 
oriented persons but the potential is there for alternative developments. Of particular interest 
here are both the entrenchment of the multicultural provisions in s. 27 Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, (Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada 
Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11) and Canada's history of red toryism. 
See also Minow, " Justice Engendered", supra note 135; Scales, "Feminist Jurisprudence" 
supra note 179 at 1376, 1387-1388, I.M. Young, "Humanism, Gynocentrism and Feminist 
Politics" ( 1985), 8 Women's Studies Int. Forum 173, 180-181, and "Difference and Polity: 
Some Reflections in the Context of the New Social Movements" (1987), 56 Cincinnati L.Rev. 
535. 
266. Marxism and Feminism (1974), 2 Women's Studies 274-288. 
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been unpacking The Myth of Masculinity (1981). In philosophy, Michael 
Ignatieff has urged us to respond to the Needs of Strangers while Larry 
Blum encouraged us to pursue Friendship, Altruism and Morality (1980). 
Michael Kaufmann has recently edited a collection of essays entitled 
Beyond Patriarchy (1986) which, despite some serious problems, also 
takes important steps towards an ethic of care.267 Or, looking back a 
century we may remember botanist, biologist, anarchist and social 
theorist, Kropotkin, who challenged Darwin's vision of "survival of the 
fittest" with an impressive account of evolution premised upon a vision 
of Mutual Aid 268 
Perhaps the most important jurisprudential effort to move towards an 
ethic of care, yet developed by a male, is that of Roberto Mangabeira 
Unger in his essay on human personality, Passion (1984). Although 
Unger fails to discuss the issue of gender or difference explicitly in his 
essay, in my opinion, there is much in Passion that correlates with 
Gilligan's work.269 Moreover, his theory of human personality provides 
access to another pervasive and, I would suggest, inspirational aspect of 
his work, "Solidarity", which he characterizes as "love struggling to move 
beyond the circle of intimacy". 270 When he expands upon solidarity the 
parallels with Gilligan are palpable, energizing, and encouraging: 
The kernel of solidarity is our feeling of responsibility for those whose lives 
touch in some way upon our own and our greater or lesser willingness to 
share in their fate. Solidarity is the social face of love: it is concern with 
another as a person rather than just respect for him (sic) as a bearer of 
formally equal rights and duties or admiration for his (sic) gifts and 
achievements. 271 
Solidarity, I suggest, is a cognate of the ethic of care. 
If we turn our attention to alternative cultures, we realize that 
anthropologists have consistently identified elements of the ethic of care 
267. See also Milner S. Ball, Lying Down Together (1985) who pursues a non-violent, 
"peaceable kingdom" premised upon theology; G. Frug, Book Review, The Language of 
Power (1984), 84 Columbia L.Rev. 1881. Moreover, even important historical figures such as 
Thomas Paine envisioned a potential America, premised upon themes that are connected with 
a polity motivated by love and friendship rather than greed, commerce and interest group 
factionalism. See Norman Jacobson, "Political Science and Political Education" (1963), 57 
Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 561. 
268. Gloria Steinem reminds us that, "some male primates carry and generally 'mother' their 
infants, male lions care for their young . .. and male penguins literally do everything except 
give birth, from hatching the eggs to sacrificing their own membranes to feed the new arrivals" 
in "Erotica v. Pornography" in Outrageous Ac.ts and Everyday Rebellions 219, 226 (1983). 
269. See, Devlin, Book Review (1986), 11 Queen's L.J. 219. 
270. Law in Modern Society 207 (1975). 
271. Ibid, 206. For a homologous feminist jurisprudential effort to reclaim love for feminist 
transformation see Ruth Colker, "Consciousness and Love: Towards a Feminist Theological 
Dialogue" (unpublished manuscript, 1988). 
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in pre-industrial societies. Social anthropologist Colin Turnball, for 
example, opines that if we value a "conscious dedication to human 
relationships affective and effective, the primative is ahead of us all the 
way."272 Margaret Mead claimed that the Arapesh Tribe of the South 
Seas is a society in which both the males and females pursue lives that are 
peaceful and co-operative, and where males play an important role in 
child care. 273 
Even within our own Euro-yanqui societies, there may be traces of the 
ethic of care, at least intracommunally, especially among those who have 
been marginalized and subordinated by mainstream society.274 For 
example, the extremely poor of Appalachia are characterized by "a 
person oriented behaviour accompanied by an ideology of levelling".275 
There are indications that "Eskimo'', Chicano and Indian children are 
critical of the· dominant culture's lack of care for others and for the , ' 
earth.276 Indeed, North American native people in general appear to 
manifest similar viewpoints.277 Moreover, scholars who have concen­
trated their research on black culture have highlighted traits that also 
dovetail in important ways with the ethic of care.278 Even game theorists 
have tentatively identified a connection between an "exploitative" 
masculinine strategy and feminine "accommodative" strategy and the 
cultural background of the male players.279 
272. The Human Cycle 21-22 (1983). Primitive is Turnball's word, our language once again 
demonstrating its value laden nature. 
273. Male and Female, 76 et seq (1968). She also discusses the Murdagumor in which women 
are aggressive, belligerent and resistant to pregnancy and nursing. Ibid., Huntington Cairns also 
draws our attention to other communities which have a high level of social integration and yet 
lack a coercive state of the kind demanded by Locke's imperative to escape from the state of 
nature. Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel 348 ( 1967). 
274. It is possible to argue that in the light of these suggestions care should be understood as 
a correlative of conditions of subordination and inequality, and therefore it is undesirable to 
encourage it. I am reluctant to accept such a proposition for that would be to buy into the 
dominant culture which too quickly prioritizes the self over the other. I think it is more 
beneficial to see care in a positive light, as an alternative vision, in spite of oppression, rather 
than because of it. 
275. Robert Denhardt, cited in Ferguson, supra note 43, at 23. 
276. Robert Coles, Eskimos, Chicanos, Indians (1977) cited in Tronto, " Beyond Gender 
Difference To a Theory of Care" (1987), 12 Signs 644, 649-51. "Eskimo" is Coles' term, not 
mine. 
277. See for example, Menno Boldt, The Quest for Justice (1986) and Patricia Monture, "Ka­
Nin-Geh-Heh-Gah-E-Sa-Nonh-Ya-Gah" (1986), 2 C.J.W.L. 159. 
278. See for example Carol.Stack, All Our Kin (1976); Betty Lou Valentine, Hustling and 
Other Hand Work: Lifestyles in the Ghetto (1978); J.L. Gwaltney, Drylongso: A Self Portrait 
of Black America (1980); G.G. Jackson, Black Psychology: An Avenue to the Study of Afro­
Americans" (1982), 12 Journal of Black Studies 241; W.W. Nobles, "Extended Self: 
Rethinking the so-called Negro self-concept" (1976), 2 Journal of Black Psychology 15. 
279. T.K. Uesugi and W.E. Vinaki, "Strategy in a Feminine Game" (1963), 26 Sociometry 75. 
See further, K. Ferguson, supra note 43 at 164. 
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So, perhaps the ethic of care may not be as rare as we have come to 
believe. Not only are there indications that people of both sexes 
experience care in their own lives, there are indications that it is already 
a constitutive, though not necessarily dominant; element in contemporary 
and alterior social relations, both public and private. Can we expand it? 
What I am suggesting is that the dominant ideology of separation and 
otherness, domination and subordination, sameness and difference, 
normal and deviant, male and female is only a partially accurate 
comprehension of the complexity of life and social interaction. It is a 
deeply structured paradigm that moulds our understandings, criticisms, 
and visions, but it is a paradigm nonetheless, and therefore, simplistic and 
repressive. It only functions in so far as it can achieve coherence, but the 
price of such coher�nce is the repression of deviations, exclusions, 
exceptions. However, as Kuhn points out, paradigms change, and they 
change because the repression of the deviations can no longer be 
effective.280 The ethic of care, I suggest, is one such deviation, it exists, it 
is real and it may even be in the ascendency as an "insurrection(al) 
subjugated knowledge",281 creating a "crisis" for the dominant ideology. 
Feminism is at the forefront of this crisis-inducing dynamic. Feminism's 
transformative vision highlights the descriptive and normative 
inadequacies of the dominant ideology and provides us with a very real 
political opportunity to bring about a paradigm-shift, to de-centre and de­
range patriarchy and violence, and to move us closer to a solidarity 
inspired society, to a society that can resist what for patriarchy has been 
a thanatical, and increasingly eschatological, imperative. This discussion 
of the ethic of care allows us to begin to soften the boundaries between 
masculine and feminine, to access the "other" in each one of us282 and to 
allow us to remake both our interpersonal and politico-juridical lives. 
280. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed. 1970). 
28 l .  Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 81 (1972). 
282. D. Cornell and A. Thurschweli, "Feminism, Negativity and Intersubjectivity" (1986), 5 
Praxis International 486, 447. I cannot emphasize this point strongly enough. My support for 
the ethic of care is not premised upon a universalistic premise that all women, regardless of 
historical, class or ethic differences have this talent because of their nurturant or maternal 
opportunities/ abilities. See for example Sara Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking" ( 1980), 6 
Feminist Studies 342. The connection between care and female is contingent, historical and 
cultural. Care cannot be reduced to matemalism. Both sexes have this capacity, it is part of our 
human potential. As Jane Flax suggests, "our similarities are even more striking if we compare 
humans to (say) toads or trees" in "Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory" 
(1987), 12 Signs 621, 636. Feminism is important not only for its concern for women's needs 
but also for its radical rejection of mankind's dangerous and damaging propensities and 
espousal of a more caring social ethos, a perspective that is shared by at least some men. 
To conjecture further, perhaps one of the reasons why we have such difficulties in 
recognizing this attribute is because of our training as lawyers, a vocation that is, at once, 
underpinned and overdetermined by visions of individualism, and an excessive orientation 
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e) Beyond Either/Or 
As the oppressed, fighting to be human, take away the oppressors' power 
to dominate and suppress, they restore to the oppressors the humanity they 
had lost in the exercise of oppression. 
Paulo Friere283 
I hope that it is clear from the foregoing analysis of the two traditions -
equalitarianism and gynocentrism - that alone each is inadequate, 
incapable of providing grounding, support and direction which a 
progressive feminism requires. Equalitarianism may either overemphasize 
autonomy and individualism thereby foregoing the importance of human 
interdependence and the necessity for empathy, or it may challenge 
masculinist hegemony on only a superficial level, thereby leaving too 
much of the . patriarchal substructure in place. On the other hand, 
gynocentrism, unless reinforced by equality, may run the risk of either 
reproducing and capitulating to the traditional repressive stereotypes or 
of denying the important needs of an individual self. But, as Jean 
Grimshaw asks, "Why should autonomy not be compatible with a 
rejection of domination and aggression, with a recognition of human 
interdependence, and for the need for care of others?"284 
There is no a priori reason why these two perspectives have to be 
considered disjunctively or as contradictory. Methodologically, feminists 
have begun to argue that either/or conceptions reflect a masculinist 
propensity to conceptualize in authoritarian, separatist and absolutist 
terms,285 thereby ignoring more holistic, complex and web-like patterns 
of interdependence. Malist epistomology espouses grand, purist principles 
resulting in "alienating dichotomies"286 while a feminist epistemology 
emphasises contextualism, and the plurality of techniques. For feminism, 
conjunction rather than disjunction, a transcendence of the apparent 
contradiction, is the better way to go. 
towards individual rights consciousness. Perhaps if we looked beyond our own discipline, and 
listened to what others have suggested we might begin to see otherwise, and pay attention to 
the ethic of care. We must be extremely careful not to falsely universalize our own experiences 
so as to ignore alternative experiences, understandings and possibilities. 
283. Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970), cited in Miles & Finn, supra note 14 at p. 304. 
284. Feminist Philosophers 47 (1986). 
285. Charlotte Bunch, "Beyond Either/Or: Feminist Options" (1976), 3 Quest 3. Marilyn 
French, Beyond Power, 500-504 (1985). 
286. A. Miles, I.F.P., supra note 21 passim. For a sustained critical feminist critique of 
dichotomous thinking, see Fran Olsen "Family and Market", surpa note 8 and "Sex of Laws", 
(unpublished manuscript 1984). For feminist criticism of dichotomous thinking that has 
negatively impacted upon the legal and cultural status of women, see Katherine O'Donovan, 
Sexual Divisions in Law (1985); A. Bottomley, S. Gibson, B. Meteyard, "Dworkin, Which 
Dworkin? Taking Feminism Seriously" (1987), 14 J. of Law and Soc. 47. 
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Therefore, although equalitarianism and gynocentrism tend to stretch 
the feminist cloth in different directions, that does not mean that there 
must be two mutually exclusive "cuttings" . . .  the feminist texture is 
malleable. In t�e same way as the woof and the warp run in competing 
directions, when the two are interconnected through weaving we are left 
with a fabric that is significantly more substantial than the sum of its 
parts. Moreover, when further different multicoloured threads are added 
the result may be "a tapestry of rich and royal hue".287 Equality, I suggest, 
is essential but not adequate, and may be complemented by a politico­
moral vision premised on the ethic of care. The weave may produce a 
cloth with the texture of a "rainbow coalition".288 
There are, I think, several different ways in which feminists can begin 
to weave equalitaria.nism and difference together in support of the 
aspiration to develop a radical transgressive practice. The first two 
suggestions are a little more abstract while the third is somewhat more 
pragmatic and already underway. 
The first proposition comes from the work of Adrienne Rich in her 
essay, "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence".289 In an 
effort to challenge the taken for granted nature of heterosexuality, with its 
correlative marginalization and suppression of lesbianism, Rich seeks to 
highlight and expand the significance of lesbianism, both historically and 
experientially. In support of this project, she develops the concept of a 
"lesbian continuum" to explain a wide range of: 
woman-identified experience; not simply the fact that a woman has had or 
consciously desired genital sexual experience with another woman. 
[Instead we should] expand it to embrace many more forms of primary 
intensity between and among women, including the sharing of a rich inner 
life, the bonding against male tyranny, the giving and receiving of practical 
and political support; if we can also hear in it such associations as 
marriage resistance . . .  we begin to grasp breadths of female history and 
psychology which have lain out of reach as a consequence of limited, 
mostly clinical definitions of 'lesbianism'.290 
Such an expansive conception of lesbianism is important for two reasons. 
First, as the reference to "clinical definitions" makes clear, lesbianism is 
not innate, it is socially constructed categorization, usually pejorative. 
287. Carole King, Tapestry. 
288. Iris Marion Young describes the "rainbow coalition" as "an idea of political public which 
goes beyond the ideal of civic friendship in which persons unite for a cdmmon purpose and 
mutual respect. While it includes commitment to equality and mµtual respect among 
participants, the idea of the rainbow coalition preserves and institutionalizes in its form of 
organizational discussion the heterogeneous groups that make it up". See also Fran Olsen's 
discussion of "rainbows", supra note 8 at 1578. 
289. (1980), 5 signs 631. 
290. Ibid, at 648-49. 
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More important, however, is the subversive aspect of the continuum: its 
ability to undermine the traditional, exclusive dichotomy of heterosexual 
or lesbian. The idea of a lesbian continuum opens up the larger possibility 
- and that is all it is - of escaping polarizing dualities that necessitate 
either/ or choices, to move towards a desired goal by holding on to both 
ends of the chain at the same time. Interpreted in this light, 
equalitarianism and difference can be understood as alternative locations 
on a continuum, potentially reinforcing and mutually interdependent 
perspectives, in pursuit of the same goal, the transcendence of women's 
subordination. 
Of course, the idea of a continuum does not resolve the tension 
between those who prefer equalitarianism and those who advocate 
difference, but. it does indicate that these are alternative emphases in the 
pursuit of the same dynamic, and it helps to keep the conversation going 
in times of stress. As a methodological contribution the continuum can be 
of strategic importance in maintaining feminist solidarity. 
The second proposition is inspired by the legal and social theorist, 
Roberto Mangabeira Unger. Unger posits that every radical social 
mQvement must, in its attempt to move from "here" to "there", develop 
the fertile terrain between reform and revolution. In his manifesto for 
socio-legal reconstruction he proposes that such movements must 
develop a dynamic fusion of ·internal development and visionary 
imagination.291 Put differently, there must be a capacity to work from 
within, to deviate, expand and remake the familiar and normal into the 
novel and transcendent, while being simultaneously informed, guided 
and inspired by a transformative vision. This symbiosis allows a 
progressive movement to eclipse the false dichotomy of fruitless reform 
and utopian aspirationalism. 
These two movements currently co-exist in the feminist movement. 
On the one side there exists the potential to internally develop and 
expand liberalism's "commitment" to equality, to remake equality into a 
substantive reality. On the other side, there is the transformative vision of 
difference, a potential value structure that challenges the hegemony of 
masculinist liberalism both in the realm of socio-political institutions and 
also in the dynamic of social interaction, and even human identity. 
Unger's proposal enables feminism to maintain both perspectives, 
practices and visions. It encourages us to understand feminism as 
maintaining both equality and difference in a simultaneous, transgressive 
dynamic, mutually reinforcing rather than exch.Jsively dichotomous or 
antithetical. 
291. The Critical Legal Studies Movement ( 1986). 
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The third inspirational source that can enable feminism to transcend a 
debilitating struggle is the work of Canadian feminist, activist and 
scholar, Angela Miles, who has already attempted the weaving process. 
Through her "integrative feminine principle" she has attempted to knit 
together both equality and difference into a mutually enriching, complex, 
politically sensitive and sophisticated feminist strategy that will minimize 
the dangers of exclusive reliance on either one or the other.292 Proactively, 
Miles claims that such a "synthesizing vision of politics" allows feminism 
to challenge the hegemony of androcentric conceptions of humanity and 
social interaction. 
The integrative feminine principle . . .  reject(s) . . .  all the dichotomies of 
industrial society that shape and limit people's existence. It asserts that 
men and women are of the same nature but, unlike reformist feminism and 
early feminist radicalism, it does not do this by insisting that women are 
just like (as good as) men. Instead it recognizes that although men and 
women ultimately share the same human existence, in the process of 
civilization certain human characteristics, capabilities and activities have 
been labelled feminine and their practice has largely been restricted to 
women and the female sphere of reproduction and personal relations.293 
Fully aware that this social construction of gender has resulted in the 
inferiorization and oppression of women294 she continues: 
The integrative feminine principle provides a value famework and an 
alternative rationality for feminist radicals' political struggle in that it 
consciously posits an alternative definition of human nature which is 
broad enough to include, and value equally, characteristics now seen as, 
and generally in fact distributed between, male and female.295 
Thus, within Miles' formulation, the conjunction of equality and 
difference provides the vital starting point for the reconstruction of social 
interaction, by espousing the reinvigoration of values that correlate with 
the ethic of care. 
III. Pornography 
1 )  Introduction 
The issue of pornography both energises and paralyses feminism. It 
energises in that it provides a concrete angle through which feminists can 
highlight the pervasiveness and the patterns of inequality, subordination 
292. K. Lahey attempts to develop aspects of Miles project to facilitate a feminist approach to 
reconstruct tax law with respect to women. "Equality and Specificity" supra note 9. 
293. Miles, I.F.P. supra note 21 at 485-486. See also Fran Olsen on a rejection of socially 
constructed dichotomies, supra note 8. 
294. Miles, I.F.P. supra note 21 at 486. 
295. Ibid., Feminists are also accutely conscious of the dangers that could be superimposed on 
their "difference claim" by conservatives such as Phyllis Schafly. 
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and misogyny in contemporary society. The feminist analysis of the 
pornographic flood provides a unique opportunity to connect experience, 
structure and critique. However, this moment of strength is also a possible 
moment of weakness in that the question of legal regulation has split 
feminism resulting in debates that have, on occasion, been acrimonious 
and visceral.296 The question that I wish to raise is a little more wide 
ranging than most of the discussions to date. My concern is whether the 
recent impulse by many feminists to seek a solution, in whole or in part, 
to the ·very real problem of pornography by recourse to legal remedies297 
undermines feminism's transformative vision of an egalitarian, non­
hierarchical, non-alienating society. Rephrased, does the legal regulation 
of pornography fit with the ethic of care, and the injunction not to hurt 
others? 
The decision to discuss feminism and pornography is deliberate and 
immediate. All too often scholarship functions in the realm of the 
abstract, toying with conceptual models and utopian visions that lack any 
solid grounding in the reality of most peoples' existence.298 By 
· introducing the pornography question, we are forced to face up to 
questions such as: what is the impact of such material on women's lives; 
is there a possibility of women's objections even being heard, never mind 
being acted upon; how should pressure groups, and society as a whole, 
deal with such issues; can legal remedies be developed to deal with such 
a problem; what are the internal legal barriers to such strategies; are legal 
remedies, in themselves, appropriate? These are highly political and 
urgent issues which need to be dealt with. Scholarship which discusses 
feminism, feminist jurisprudence, law and pornography is committed 
scholarship, engaged scholarship, political scholarship.299 It rejects the 
pseudo-scientific objectivity which most legal scholarship claims for itself 
by making it clear that legal discourse is political discourse; that what we 
are involved in is in no way distinct from politics, but integral to it.300 
Normative questions are the very life blood of law, particularly when law 
is understood through the prism/speculum of gender.301 
296. See for example, Catharine MacKinnon, "Standards of Sisterhood" (1985), 7(3) 
Broadside; Letters to the Editor, (1986) 7(4) Broadside 297. 
297. For a useful, brief review of some of the various viewpoints of women on pornography 
and the question of legal regulation, see K. Lahey "The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Pornography: Toward a Theory of Actual Gender Equality" (1984-85), 20 New Eng. L.Rev. 
649, 649-51. See also E. Spahn, "Sex and Violence" "ibid., at 629, 630. 
298. For a discussion of why it is important for feminism to reject abstraction and concentrate 
upon contextualism, see Carol Gould, "The Woman Question Philosophy of Liberation and 
the Liberation of Philosophy" (C. Gould and M. Wartofsky eds. 1976) Women and 
Philosophy. 
299. See MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 1 .  
300. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (1986); Politics 
(1987). 
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2) A Feminist Critique of Pornography 
Traditionally, the story of pornography has been overdetermined by the 
constitutionality of anti-pornography legislation, or recent common law developments such as 
R. v. Wagner (1985), 43 C.R. (3d) 319, 37 Alta. L.Rev. (2d) 301 (Q. B.). The politically and 
logically prior question for feminists - but not for legal fetishists - is whether legal remedies 
are the most fruitful path to follow. I believe that the constitutional argument can be 
persuasively argued both ways. It is political predispositions that tilt the balance. 
Those who view anti-pornography legislation as constitutionally valid include: 
K. Lahey, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Pornography: Toward a Theory of 
Actual Gender Equality" (1984-85), 20 New England L.Rev. 649. 
Lahey, "The Charter and Pornography: Toward a Restricted Theory of Constitutionally 
Protected Expression", in Litigating the Values of a Nation 265 (J. Weiler and R. Elliot 
eds. 1986). 
Michael Gershell, "Evaluating a Proposed Civil Rights Approach to Pornography: 
Legal Analysis as if Women Really Mattered" (1985), 11 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 41. 
Cass Sunstein, "Pornography and the First Amendment" (1986), Duke L.J. 589. 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, "Not a Moral Issue" (1984), 2 Yale Law and Policy Rev. 
321 [hereinafter cited as "Not Moral"]; "Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech" 
(1985), 20 Har. C.R.C.L.Rev. 1 [hereinafter cited as "Speech"]. 
Some of those who would disagree include: 
Randall D.B. Tigue, "Civil Rights and Censorship - Incompatible Bedfellows" 
(1985), 11 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 81. 
Louise Arbour, "The Politics of Pornography: Towards an Expansive Theory of 
Constitutionally Protected Expression", Litigating the Values of a Nation, ibid at 294. 
James R. Branit, "Reconciling Free Speech and Equality: What Justifies Censorship?" 
(1986), 9 Harvard Journal Law & Public Policy, 429. 
Geoffrey R. Stone, "Anti-Pornogragby Legislation or Viewpoint Discrimination" 
(1986), 9 Harvard Journal Law & Public Policy 461. 
T. Emerson, "'Pornography and the First Amendment' A Reply to Professor 
MacKinnon" (1984), 3 Yale Law and Policy Review 130. 
A. Alan Borovoy, "Freedom of Expression: Some Recurring Impediments", in Justice 
Beyond Orwell 125 (R. Abella & M. Rothman eds. 1985). 
Robin Elliott, "Freedom of Expression and Pornography: The Need for a Structured 
Approach to Charter Analysis", in Litigating the Values of a Nation, ibid at 308 - sits 
on the surface, non-committal, but overall tone suggests he favours expression. 
Barry W. Lynn, "Civil Rights' Ordinances and the Attorney General's Commission: 
New Developments in Pornography Regulation" (1986), 21 Harv. C.R.C.L.L.Rev. 27. 
Alan Dershhowtiz, "Women's War on Porn", Time, August 27th, 1979 at 64. 
There are a couple of comments that I would like to make on the strategic significance of 
constitutionalization of the pornography issue. First, feminist advocates of legal controls on 
pornography or remedies against pornography must have comtemplated the very high 
likelihood that this would become a constitutional issue. As feminists have pointed out time 
and again, law is a male-constructed and dominated episteme, discourse and practice, therefore 
it was predictable that the constitutional twist would occur. 
The second issue raised by recourse to law, is the danger of distraction. What started off for 
feminism as an issue of powerlessness has, through the hegemonic dynamic of legal discourse, 
been recorded as an issue of constitutionally protected speech, and the correlative miasmic 
morass of doctrinal arguments that accompany such an encoding. What we find is what Robert 
Samek bas described as metapbenomenalism, a perennial shifting of the locus of the problem, 
a continual slide to the peripheral. Robert Samek, The Metaphenomenon (1981). Not only is 
this encoding process a distraction, it is also insidious that it is liberal legalism, not feminism, 
which bas a powerful bold over the popular psyche and the appeal to constitutional rights 
allows the liberals to portray progressive feminism in a negative light ... casting them as 
totalitarian despots. The consitutional twist, therefore, automatically puts the feminist challenge 
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concept of "obscenity"302 resulting in a conceptualization and discourse 
in terms of conservatism versus liberalism, 303 "Victorian priggishness" 
versus sexual liberation, intolerance versus prurience. 304 Thus, until 
recently, pornography has been understood as morality play305 rather 
than an act of political power, phallic power.306 
302. See for example, Clor, Obscenity and Public Morality (1975); Oybikowski, "Law, 
Liberty and Obscenity" (1972), 7 U.B.C.L.Rev. 38; Hunter, "Obscenity, Pornography and 
Law Reform" (1975-76), 2 Dal. L.J. 482; Pornography and Censorship (D. Copp and S. 
Wendell eds. 1983); Joel Feinberg, "Pornography and the Criminal Law" (1979), 40 U. Pitt. 
L.Rev. 567; F. Schauer, The Law of Obscenity (1976); D.A. J. Richards, "Free Speech and 
Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment" (1974-75), 123 U. Pa. 
L.Rev. 45 and The Moral Criticism of Law, 56-77 (1977); Alan Young, "News From the Front 
- The War on .Obscenity and the Death of Doctrinal Purity (forthcoming, Osgoode Hall 
L. J.). 
303. United States Commission on Obscenity and Pornography (1971); E. Hoffman, 
"Feminism, Pornography and Law" (1985-86), 133 U. Pa. L.Rev. 497, 504-510; Amitai 
Etzioni, "Porn is here to stay", New York Times, May 17, 1977 at 35; Paul Goodman, Utopian 
Essays & Practical Proposals 57 (1962); Kathleen E. Mahoney, "Obscenity, Morals and The 
Law: Challenging Basic Assumptions" in Justice Beyond Orweli supra note 301, at 77. Some 
observers suggest that anti-pornography feminists, although adopting a different approach, 
have entered into an alliance with conservatives. See for example, Donald Downs, "The 
Attorney General's Commission and the New Politics of Pornography" (1987), 4 A. B.F.R. J. 
641; Robin West, "The Feminist-Conservative Anti-Pornography Alliance and the 1986 
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography Report" (1987), 4 A. B.F.R.J. 681; Varda 
Burstyn, Women Against Censorship ( 1985). 
304. Schipper, "Filthy Lucre, A Tour of America's Most Profitable Frontier", Mother Jones 
31, April 1980; Margaret Baldwin, "The Sexuality of Inequality" (1984), 2 Law and 
Inequality 629. 
305. See, Roth v. U.S. 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see C. 
Jacobs, "Patterns of Violence" (1984), 7 Harvard Women's L.Rev. 5, 29-36. Canada for a long 
time has followed the English decision of R. v. Hicklin (1868), 3 Q.B. 359, 18 L.T. 395; and 
Brodie v. The Queen, [1902] S.C.R. 681, 32 D.L.Rev. (2d) 507. See also Joel Bakan, 
"Pornography, Law and Moral Theory" (1985), 17 Ottawa L.Rev. 1. 
Nor should we be confident that this dominant interpretation has now passed. For example, 
although the U.S. Attorney-General's Commission on Pornography Final Report, July 1986, 
does refer to more recent interpretations of pornography, including that expoused by feminists, 
its overall tone is still staunchly moralistic. Moreover, moralism pervades a recent Canadian 
proposal to criminalize pornography which it defines as: 
any visual showing vaginal, anal or oral intercourse, ejaculation, sexually violent 
behaviour, bestiality, incest, necrophilia, masturbation or other sexual activity. 
( emphasis added) 
Bill C-114, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and Customs Act, 1st Session, 33rd Par!., 
1984-85-86, cl. 7. After extensive criticism, this proposal has been withdrawn to be replaced 
with a somewhat more specific definition. See Bill C-54, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, 
2nd Session, 33rd Par!., 1986-87, s. 1. But this too seems to have lapsed. 
Again moralism appears to be on the ascendency in the u:s. Supreme Court in Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) which upheld the constitutional validity of state sodomy 
prohibitions, and the rhetoric of Judaeo-Christian morality. Similarly there is a subtle mixture 
of moralistic discourse and feminism in the S.C.C. decision in Towne Cinema Theatres v. R., 
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 494, [1985] 4 W.R.R. l , 37 Alta. L.Rev. (2d) 289, 45 C.R. (3d) I ;  18 
D.L.Rev. (4th) 1. 
306. Catharine A. MacKinnon, "Not Moral", supra note 301 at 321; Beverly Brown, "A 
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In recent years, feminists have retold the story and but now we see 
pornography as vicious, chilling, horrifying. Pornography has been 
disconnected from obscenity, and the restraining conceptual hegemony of 
the moralistic see-saw has been overturned. By articulating the integral 
connection between gender and power, feminism has gone a long way in 
providing a deeper understanding of the nature and effects of the 
pornographic phenomenon.307 It has named308 pornography for what it is: 
a vital constitutive component in the continued existence of the ideology 
and practice of male supremacism. The sexual revolution of the 'sixties 
and 'seventies was not a woman's revolution,309 and therapeutic de­
repression has become domination. In short pornography is an exemplary 
moment of patriarchy.310 
As I have already indicated there are many different feminist perspectives, and these varying 
viewpoints have concretized themselves in relation to the pornography debate. What follows 
is an outline of the most critical feminist approach to pornography, one that sees pornography 
as having no redeeming qualities from a feminist perspective. Frequently, this is perceived as 
"the radical feminist" critique of pornography. 
However, pornography is part of a broader debate within feminism, what has been called 
"The feminist sexuality debate". See e.g., (1984-85), 10  Signs 102-135; C. Cohen, "The 
Feminist Sexuality Debate: Ethics and Politics" (1986), 2 Hypatia 71 .  Other feminists who 
claim to be just as radical as the anti-pornography feminists, argue that pornography is not 
monolithically oppressive, that some women find some pornography to be liberating, and 
transformative. See in particular, Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality (C. Vance 
ed. 1984); Powers of Desire, (Ano Snitow et al. eds. 1983); Robin West, "Toe Feminist 
Conservative Anti-Pornography Alliance" (1987), 4 A. B.F.R.J. 681; Paula Webster, 
"Pornography and Pleasure" (1981), 3 Heresies 48. See also Alan Soble, Pornography: 
Marxism, Feminism and the Future of Sexuality (1986) for a Marxist defence of pornography, 
that envisions a positive role for pornography in a non-alienated society, pornography as a 
contribution "to the rich, sensual, sexual lives of communist people" at 108. 
307. See for example, Irene Diamond, "Pornography and Repression: A Reconsideration" 
(1980), 5 Signs 686; A. Dworkin, "Against the Male Aood" (1985), 8 Harvard Women's Law 
Journal 1, Women Hating 78 (1976); Pornography: Men Pres sing Women (1981); S. Griffin, 
Pornography and Silence (1981); Take Back the Night: Women and Pornography (L. Lederer 
ed. 1980); Catharine A. MacKinnoo, "Not Moral", supra note 301, 
Obscenity law is concerned with morality, specifically morals from the male point of 
view, meaning the standpoint of male dominance. The feminist critique of pornography 
is a politics, specifically politics from women's point of view, meaning the standpoint 
of the subordination of women to men. Morality here means good and evil; politics 
means power and powerlessness. Obscenity is a moral idea; pornography is a political 
practice. Obscenity is abstract; pornography is concrete (at 322-323). 
See also Feminism Unmodified, Part III, "Pornography". 
Susan Cole, "Gagged, Bound and Silenced: Confronting Pornography" (1981), 10 
Broadside 11; Anne Cameron, "Hardcore Horror", Broadside (Feb. 1983); Geraldine Fino, 
"Against Sexual Imagery: Alternative or Otherwise" (1986), 12 Parallelogramme. 
308. For a discussion of the power of "naming" see Mary O' Brien, "Feminism and 
Revolution" in Feminism in Canada, supra note 14 at 251, 259; Scales supra note 179 at 1383, 
footnote 59; Dworkin, "Male Aood" supra note 307 at 9. 
309. Diamond supra note 307 at 701; MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 144, Snitow et 
al. supra note 306 at 12. See contra B. Ehrenreich, E. Hess, G. Jacobs, Remaking Love: The 
Feminization of Sex ( 1986). 
310. MacKinnon goes so far as to posit that, "In a feminist perspective, pornography is the 
- . . 
. 
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A radical feminist interpretation of pornography operates on several 
levels of analysis. The first step in a feminist understanding of 
pornography is to contextualize it, to relate pornography to the formative 
conditions of domination and subordination which characterize 
contemporary male/female relations. "The major theme of pornography 
as a genre is male power, its nature, its magnitude, its use, its meaning."311 
As institution, empire312 and practice,313 by eulogizing male power and 
eroto-legitimizing female powerlessness, pornography generates, reflects 
and reinforces the relations of gender inequality, exploitation, 
humiliation, degradation, objectification, dehumanization and subjuga-
. tion that characterize contemporary society. In and of itself, pornography 
demonstrates men's power in that it captures their controlling ability to 
make women's bodies say what men want them to say. Feminism 
understands pornography from the bottom up, from the perspective of its 
victims, women, "the sexual disappeared"314 of modern society, not its 
male entrepreneurs nor its consumers. 
By locating pornography in the experiential circumstances of women's 
lives, by shifting attention from amorphous and indeterminate abstract 
ideas such as "morality" and "free speech", feminism reconstructs the 
question of pornography as an issue of equality. Feminism argues that 
pornography violates women's human and civil rights, it is therefore a 
form of sex discrimination.315 
Similarly, Dworkin claims that "At the heart of the female condition is pornography; it is the 
ideology that is the source of all the rest". Right Wing Women (1983) at 222-223, but see 
contra, Carol Vance and Ann Barr Snitow, "Toward a Conversation about Sex in Feminism" 
(1984), 10 Signs 126, 132. 
311. Dworkin, Male Flood, supra note 307 at 24; C. MacKinnon, "Francis Biddle's Sister", 
in Feminism Unmodified 163 (1987); Myrna Kostash, "Whose Body, Whose Self?"; M. 
Fitzgerald, C. Guberman, M. Wolfe, Still Ain't Satisfied 43 (1982). 
312. "There are more hardcore bookstores than there are McOonalds" in "Pornography: 
Liberalism or Oppression", Off Our Backs 14, March 1983. See generally, Jacobs, supra note 
305; Report of the Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution in Canada Vol 1 
(1985), passim 
M. Langelan, "The Political Economy of Pornography" (1981), 5 Aegis; Cook, "The X­
Rated Economy", Forbes, Sept. 18, 1978, at 81. In 1981 ,  Americans spent $2.75 billion at 
motion picture theatres, INTERNATIONAL MOTION PICTURE ALMANAC 28A (R. 
Gertner ed. 1984), and consumed $4.246 billion worth of phonograph records and tapes, 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL A BSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 
237 (1984). In 1980, pornographic video cassettes outsold other video cassettes by three to 
one. Langelan, ibid, at 8. 
Galloway and Thornton "Crackdown on Pornography - A No-Win Battle" U.S. News 
and World Report June 4th 1986, at 84. 
31�. Pornography is more than abstract speech; it is a horrifying, perhaps deadly, reality and 
process for many women. See also MacKinnon, "Not Moral", supra note 301 at 337. 
314. A. Dworkin, quoted in C. McKinnon, "Pornography as Sex Discrimination" (1986), 4 
Law & Inequality 38, at 40 [hereinafter cited as "Discrimination"]. 
315. Catherine A. MacKinnon, "Discrimination"; " . . .  pornography, not alone but crucially, 
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Second, concretizing their understanding of power(lessness ), feminists 
argue that pornography is primarily about physical and psychological 
violence against women, not sex.316 Violence is pervasive in pornography, 
both hard and soft core; if one simply looks at it one can see that women 
are the victims of routinized violence. Often, if the violence is not explicit, 
it is implied or waiting in the background. Pornography both sanctions 
and promotes violence against women. It terrorizes.317  Moreover, 
quantitatively and qualitatively, it is on the increase.318 
Third, pornography as violence, through its production and 
proliferation, directly harms women, individually and as an identifiable 
group. The harm operates on several different levels. 
a) "Models"319 who are directly involved in the porngraphy industry are 
harmed. Many are hu�t in the course of the "recruitment" and making 
institutionalizes a subhuman victimized second class status for women in particular" at 44. See 
also, "Speech", supra note 301; Feminism Unmodified at 200-201. 
316. Kate Millet, Sexual Politics (1970); Robert Stoller, Perversion, The Erotic Form of 
Hatred (1976); Colloquium, "Violent Pornography: Degradation of Women versus Right of 
Free Speech" (1978-79), 8 N.Y.U. Rev. Law and Soc. Change, 181-308; Elizabeth Spahn "On 
Sex and Violence" (1984-85), 20 New England L.Rev. 629; Edward Donnerstein, "Sex and 
Censorship" (1984), 20(b) Film Comment 34-35; "Pornography: Its Effect on Violence 
Against Women" in Pornography and Sexual Aggression 53-81 (Malamuth and Donnerstein 
eds. 1984); D. Linz, Steven Penrod, Ed. Donnerstein, The Question of Pornography: Research 
Findings and Policy Implications (1987); "The Attorney General's Commission on 
Pornography: The Gaps between the Findings and the Facts" (1987), 4 A. B.F.R.J. 713; West, 
"Hedonic Lives" supra note 164 at 66. 
It must be made clear, however, that feminism distances itself from moralist objections. It 
does not seek to repress sexuality nor object to the portrayal of sexual conduct, but seeks to 
discriminate between pornography (violence) and erotica. It seeks to alter, not eradicate, 
sexuality! See Gloria Steinem, "Erotica v. Pornography: A Clear and Present Difference", in 
Outrageous Acts and Everyday Rebellions 219 (1983). A. Dworkin Pornography 199-200 
(1981). See also Ann Garry, "Pornography and Respect for Women" (1976-78), 4 Social 
Theory and Practice 395; and Irene Diamond supra note 307 at 686. 
MacKinnon appears not to agree with this analysis. She claims that this is a liberal position 
which "trivialize(s) and evade(s) the essence of (the feminist) critique, while seeming to express 
it". "Not Moral", supra note 301 at 343. See also "Linda's Life and Andrea's Work" in 
Feminism Unmodified at 130. As I understand her, she appears to believe that so pervasive is 
the inequality, hierarchy and domination of contemporary society that it is difficult to 
distinguish violence from heterosexual sex. See also Dworkin, Intercourse ( 1987). She suggests 
that the "violence not sex" critique fails to ask deeper questions of what are women's identities, 
independent of that which are created for them by men. 
317. A. Dworkin, "Pornography: The New Terrorism" (1978), The Body Politic, August, 
1978; MacKinnon, "Not Moral", supra note 426 at 301; Feminism Unmodified at 140. 
318. C. Jacobs, "Patterns of Violence", supra note 305; Mahoney, supra note 428 at 95; 
Malamuth and Spinner, "A Longitidunal Context Analysis of Sexual Violence in the Best 
Selling Erotic Magazines" (1980), 16 J. of Sex Research 226; But see D. Linz, Steven Penrod, 
E. Donnerstein, The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography: The Gaps between the 
Findings and the Facts" (1987), 4 A. B.F.R. J. 713, 716-718. 
319. The use of the word "model" is both accurate and intentional for in pornography these 
women are treated as reified objects, not as persons. 
192 The Dalhousie Law Journal 
such movies,320 some have been killed.321 The material doesn't lie . . .  the 
women are hurting when they are "cut, beaten, tied and hung . . .  "322 
Often, pornography is a "recording, not a simulation of real violence".323 
The more "fortunate" women who are not physically hurt are reduced to 
accessible orifices, objects of masculinist gratification, non-persons. There 
is some evidence of self-hatred among pornographic models.324 
b) Harm is caused to women on whom men attempt to realize their 
pornographic desires: The pithyist encapsulation of this claim is Robin 
Morgan's proposition that "pornography is the theory, and rape is the 
practice".325 This can be understood as "pornography as text-book";326 
men force pornography on women and demand that they do what they 
see. Pornography educates, instructs and inspires men in the art of "sexual 
callousness". 327 It is claimed that there is a direct causal connection 
between pornography and violence against women, a causality which "is 
essentially collective and totalistic and contextual".328 Viewed in this 
320. K. Barry, Female Sexual Slavery (1979); L. Lovelace & M. McGrady, Ordeal (1980); 
U.N. Economic and Social Council; Activities for the Advancement of Women: Equality 
Development and Peace, Report of Jean Fernand-Laurent (March 17, 1983); Lederer, "Then 
and Now: Interviews with a Former Pornography Model" Take Back the Night 57 (1980); A 
Dworkin, "Pornography's 'Exquisite Volunteers'" Ms Magazine March 1981, at 65. 
321. Snuff movies exist. See MacKinnon, "Not Moral", supra note 30 l at 33 fn. 61. 
322. See Baldwin supra note 304 at 637. 
323. West, "Hedonic Lives" supra note 164 at 68. 
324. N. Van den Ven and D. Russell eds. Crimes Against Women: Proceedings of the 
International Tribunal 182-183 (1976). 
325. Morgan, "Theory and Practice: Pornography and Rape" in Going Too Far 163, 169 
(1977); see also S. Griffin, Pornography and Silence (1981); Leah Fritz, "Pornography as 
Gynocidal Propaganda" (1978-79), 8 N.Y.U. Rev. L. Soc. Change 219. 
326. Margaret Baldwin, "The Sexuality of lnequality" supra note 304 at 639. 
327. Baldwin ibid. at 640-641. For example, Brownmiller argues that pornography "promotes 
a climate in which acts of sexual hostility directed against women are not only tolerated but 
ideologically encouraged" Against Our Will 395 (1975). 
328. C. MacKinnon, "Not Moral", supra note 301 at 338. See also 323-324. "Speech", supra 
note at 43-60; Feminism Unmodified at 202. Joel Bakan, supra note 305. 
This claim stands in stark opposition to the conclusion reached by the 1970 Commission . . .  
"empirical research .. . has found no reliable evidence to date that exposure to explicit sexual 
materials plays a significant role in the causation of delinquent or criminal sexual behaviour 
among youth or adults". Report, supra note 304 at 139. For a critique, see Diamond, supra 
note 307 at 693-697. 
More recently, the Report on Pornography and Prostitution in Canada, Vol. 1 (1985) was 
reluctant but overt in admitting that it, 
is not prepared to state, solely on the evidence and research it has seen, that 
pornography is a significant causal factor in the commission of some forms of violent 
crime, in the sexual abuse of children; or the disintegration of communities and 
societies, at 99. 
But the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, Final Report (1986) did find such 
a causal connection at 324. 
This has become the most controversal claim and a collosal amount of laboratory research 
has been put into (dis)proving that pornography increases misogyny and sexual callousness. A 
catalogue of some of the studies includes: Baron, "The Aggression-Inhibiting Influence of 
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light, pornography encourages and legitimizes practices such as sexual 
harrassment, child abuse, assault and rape. 
Worse still, women who are exposed to pornography internalize 
pornography's misogynistic construction of their identity/nature, thus 
Heightened Sexual Arousal" (1974), 30 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 318; Baron, "The 
Aggression-Inhibiting Influence of Sexual Humor" (1978), 36 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 
189; Baron, "Sexual Arousal and Physical Aggression: The Inhibiting Influence of 'Cheesecake 
and Nudes"' (1974), 3 Bull. Psychonomic Soc'y 337; Baron and Strauss, "Sexual Stratification, 
Pornography and Rape in the United States" and Court, "Sex and Violence: A Ripple Effect" 
both in Pornography and Sexual Aggression (Malamuth and Donnerstein eds. 1984); Mosher 
& Katz, "Pornographic Films, Male Verbal Aggression Against Women, and Guilt" (1971), 8 
Technical Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 357; Siegman & Dintur, 
"The Catharsis of Aggression and Hostility" (1977), 41 Psych'! Rep. 399; Zillmann, Johnson 
& Hanrahan, "Pacifying Effect of Happy Ending of Communications Involving Aggression" 
(1973), 32 Psych'! Rep. 967;' Zillman & Sapolsky, "What Mediates the Effect of Mild Erotica 
on annoyance and Hostile Behaviour in Males? (1977), 35 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 587; 
Donnerstein & Barrett, "Effects of Erotic Stimuli on Male Aggression Toward Females" 
(1978), 36 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 180; Donnerstein, Donnerstein, & Barrett, "Where Is 
the Facilitation of Media Violence: The Effects of Non-Exposure and Placement of Anger 
Arousal" (1976), 10 J. Research Personality 386; Donnerstein, Donnerstein & Evans, "Erotic 
Stimuli and Aggression: Facilitation or Inhibition" (1975) 32 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 237; 
Jaffe & Berger, "Cultural Generality of the Relationship Between Sex and Aggression" (1977), 
41 Psych'! Rep. 335; Jaffe, Malamuth, Feingold & Feshback, "Sexual Arousal and Behavioral 
Aggression" (1974), 30 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 759; Lenes & Hart, "The Influence of 
Pornography and Violence on Attitudes and Guilt" (1975), 45 J. Sch. Health 447; Loye, 
"T.V.'s Impact on Adults: It's Not All Bad News" (1978), Psych. Today 87; Mueller, Nelson 
& Donnerstein, "Facilitation Effects of Media Violence on Helping" (1977), 40 Psych'! Rep. 
775; Tannenbaum, "Emotional Arousal As a Mediator of Erotic Communication Effects" 
(1971), 8 Technical Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 326; 
Berkowitz, "Sex and Violence: We Can't Have It Both Ways" (1971), 5 Psychology Today 14; 
Wills, "Measuring the Impact of Erotica" (1977), 11 Psychology Today 30; H. Eysenck & D. 
Nias, Sex, Violence and the Media 257 (1979); Donnerstein, "Aggressive Erotica and Violence 
Against Women" (1980), 39 J. Personality and Social Psychology 269; Feschbach & 
Malamuth, "Sex and Aggression: Proving the Link" (1978), 12 Psychology Today 110; 
Malamuth and Donnerstein, Pornography and Sexual Aggression (1984). See also Chervenak, 
"Selected Bibliography on Pornography and Violence" (1979), 40 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 652, 658-
60; 
My own viewpoint is that if we believe that "literature" can have a beneficial impact in 
structuring our society, why can it not also have a negative impact? Although we must be very 
careful about "inferring causality from correlational evidence", the nexus between 
pornography and violence is certainly plausible. This is an intuitive and perhaps "unprovable 
assumption . . .  " (Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton 413 U.S. 49, 60-61) (1972) but it can hardly 
be denied that advertising doesn't work. Second, what we have here is a classic example of 
sliding to the peripheral. Scientism and empiricism, the realm of experts, has become the 
dominant and exclusive discourse in the thrust and parry of debate. Normative engagement is 
displaced by a psuedo-objective debate which may obscure preconceptions and bias rather 
than articulating them. For a critique of the androcentric tilt of scientism see Margaret Benston, 
"Feminism and the Critique of Scientific Method" in Feminism in Canada, supra note 14 at 
47. See also Evelyn Fox Keller, "Feminist Critique of Science" (1980), 1 Fundamenta 
Scientiae. 
Indeed the issue of pornography and violence is a classic example of the indeterminacy, 
malleability and bias of scientific research, dependent upon the unquestioned assumptions. 
Compare, for example, President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence 
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undercutting their autonomy, lowering their self image, crushing their 
potential and permitting the continuance of male domination.329 
c) Women, in general, are harmed because they suffer from a hate 
propaganda330 which annihilates their dignity and self-respect as human 
beings, by portraying them as no more than fuckable objects or degrading 
them as virginal nymphomanics who need men to tame them, or beat 
them. In this perspective, women are whores by nature, nothing more 
than the sum of their sexual parts. Pornography, contributes in a vitally 
important way to the continued exploitation and subordination of 
women as a class, by constructing them as less than human. By 
desensitizing men to the personhood of women, it helps construct and 
reinforce women's lived reality of inequality.331 
These the�es are all brought together in the following lengthy 
quotation by Andrea Dworkin: 
In the United States, pornography is an $8-billion trade in sexual 
exploitation. 
(1969) with Report of Commission on Obscenity and Pornography (Washington, D.C., Govt. 
Printing Office, 1970) which reach diametrically competing conclusions with respect to the 
impact of the media on violence-inducing behaviour. See Diamond supra note 307 at 69 l .  
Beyond this there is the fundamental issue of what qualifies as competent material. Should we 
accept claims by people who work in women's shelters and police officers that in their 
experience pornography and violence are related? 
At least one U.S. case has already acknowledged the causal role of pornography in 
promoting violence: State v. Herberg 324 N.W. 2d 346 (Minn. 1982). Moreover, Judge Sarah 
Evans Baker and Judge Frank Easterbrook both accepted that pornography does cause harm 
. . .  thereby going further than they may have intended to. They calculated, however, that the 
harm was not so great as to merit an exception being made to the First Amendment. See 
American Booksellers v. Hudnut 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984) all 771 F. 2d 323 (7th 
Cir. 1985). For a useful discussion of this case see R. Benson, "Pornography and the First 
Amendment: American Booksellers v. Hudnut" (1986), 9 Harv. Women's Law Journal 153. 
329. C. Jacobs, "Patterns of Violence: A Feminist Perspective on the Regulation of 
Pornography" (1984), 7 Harvard Womens L.J. 5, 18; M. Vivar, "The New Anti-Female 
Violent Pornography: Is Moral Condemnation the Only Justifiable Response?" (1981-82), 7 
Law and Psych. Rev. 53, 63. 
330. Labelle, "The Propaganda of Misogyny" in Take Back the Night supra note 307, at 174; 
Susan Brownmillar claims that "pornography is the undiluted essence of female propaganda" 
in Against Our Will 394 ( 1975). 
331. There is a fourth harm caused by pornography . . .  the harm to men. As Ms. Anthony 
posits: 
Violent pornography is also harmful to men and lessens the quality of community life 
. . .  It is dangerous for men to have the dehumanized view of sex which results from 
viewing pornography. It distorts their image. of women and debases them as well. 
She continues: 
"This type of propaganda portrayed in pornography is equally harmful to men and 
women." 
Dialogue, in "Colloquium on Violent Pornography" supra note 316, at 191-192. 
Although the last sentence clearly goes too far, it must be recognized that pornography is not 
necessarily good for men just because they like it, or use it voluntarily. If structures are 
important, then it is not open to us to blithely identify voluntariness with "the good". 
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It is women turned into subhumans, beaver, pussy, body parts, genitals 
exposed, buttocks, breasts, mouths opened and throats penetrated, covered 
in semen, pissed on, shitted on, hung from light fixtures, tortured, maimed, 
bleeding, disemboweled, killed. 
It is some creature called female, used. 
It is scissors poised in the vagina and objects stuck in it, a smile on the 
woman's face, her tongue hanging out. 
It is a woman being fucked by dogs, horses, snakes. 
It is every torture in every prison cell in the world, done to women and 
sold as sexual entertainment. 
It is rape and gang rape and anal ·rape and throat rape: and it is the 
woman raped, asking for more. 
It is the woman in the picture to whom it is really happening and the 
woman against whom the picture is used, to make them do what the 
woman in the picture is doing. 
It is the power men have over women turned into sexual acts men do 
to women, because pornography is the power and the act. 
It. is the conditioning of erection and orgasm in men to the 
powerlessness of women; our inferiority, humiliation, pain, torment; to us 
as objects, things or commodities for use in sex as servants. 
It sexualizes inequality and in doing so creates discrimination as a sex­
based practice. 
It permeates the political condition of women in society by being the 
substance of our inequality however located - in jobs, in education, in 
marriage, in life. 
It is women, kept a sexual underclass, kept available for rape and 
battery and incest and prostitution. 
It is what we are under male domination; it is what we are for under 
male domination. 
It is the heretofore hidden (from us) system of subordination that 
women have been told is just life. 
Under male supremacy, it is the synonym for what being a woman is. 
It is access to our bodies as a birthright to men: the grant, the gift, the 
permission, the license, the proof, the promise, the method, how-to; it is us 
accessible, no matter what the law pretends to say, no matter what we 
pretend to say. 
It is physical injury and physical humiliation and physical pain: to the 
women against who it is used after it is made; to the women used to make 
it. 
As words alone, or words and pictures, moving or still, it creates 
systematic harm to women in the form of discrimination and physical 
hurt. It creates harm inevitably by its nature because of what it is and what 
it does. The harm will occur as long as it is made and used. The name of 
the next victim is unknown, but everything else is known. 
Because of it - because it is the subordination of women perfectly 
achieved - the abuse done to us by any human standard is perceived as 
using us for what we are by nature: women are whores; women want to 
be raped; she provoked it; women like to be hurt; she says no but means 
yes because she wants to be taken against her will which is not really her 
will because what she wants underneath is to have anything done to her 
that violates or humiliates or hurts her; she wants it, because she is a 
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woman, no matter what it is, because she is a woman; that is how women 
are, what women are, what women are for. This view is institutionally 
expressed in law. So much for equal protection. 
If it were being done to human beings, it would be reckoned an atrocity. 
It is being done to women. It is reckoned fun, pleasure, entertainment, sex, 
somebody's (not something's) civil liberty no less.332 
3) Feminist Responses to Pornography 
Feminists have not limited themselves to merely describing and critiquing 
the misogynistic nature of pornography. Reflecting their own horror and 
fear of pornography, and motivated by the lived experience of other 
women who have been its victims, feminists have developed various 
strategies of political resistence, extra-legal, illegal, and legal. 
Extra-legally, feminists have developed consumer boycott techniques 
and economic· sanctions such as picketing, letter-writing campaigns, 
petitions and leafletting. On an educational level, they have developed 
speak-outs, teach-ins, and published information on the producers, 
distributors, exhibitors and users of pornography. There have been 
consciousness-raising slide shows and documentaries on the harm caused 
by pornography.333 Others have suggested the development of a 
subversive, "alternative literature of arousal";334 or the creation of new 
types of videos which would break the connection between sex and harm 
and demonstrate the realizability of egalitarian sexual relationships.335 
Many feminists help the victims of pornography through abuse shelters. 
Still others have participated in illegal "vigilante squads" which have, on 
332. Andrea Dworkin, "Against the Male Flood" (1985), 8 Harvard Women's Law Journal 
1, 10-11. For the legal correlative of such an understanding see the Anti-Pornography 
Ordinance, Minneapolis Minn., Ordinance amending tit. 7, chs. 139 and 141, Minneapolis 
Code of Ordinances Relating to Civil Rights (Dec. 30, 1983). For a text, see Feminism 
Unmodified at 262, footnote I .  I should also note that I do not think Dworkin's analysis can 
qualify as a pornographic vignette. See Part A of this article at footnote 24 p. 310. 
333. See for example, Not a Love Story. 
334. Nancy W. Waring, "Coming to Terms with Pornography" (1986), 8 Research in Law 
Deviance and Social Control 85; Paula Webster, "Pornography and Pleasure" (1981), 3 
Heresies 48-51; Jessica Benjamin, "Master and Slave: The Fantasy of Erotic Domination" in 
Powers of Desire 380-99 (Ann Snitow ed. 1983); Ann Snitow, "Mass Market Romance: 
Pornography for Women is Different" in Snitow ibid. at 245-263; D. English, "The Politics of 
Porn" Mother Jones 20, April 1980; Ann Ferguson, "Sex War .. . " (1984), IO Signs 106, 111; 
Audre Lorde, "Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power", [1984] Sister Outsider 55. 
335. Ann Garry, "Pornography and Respect for Women" (1978), 4 Social Theory and 
Practice 395; Bette Gordon's film "Variety" is · even more "ambitious" in that it posits that 
pornography is not a monolithic bloc, that it is potentially subversive and that attempts should 
be made by women to appropriate its subversive elements to expand women's sexual freedom. 
See Gordon "Variety: The Pleasure of Looking", in Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female 
Sexuality 189-203 (C. Vance ed. 1984); but see Geraldine Finn, "Against Sexual Imagery: 
Alternative or Otherwise" (1986), 12 Parallelogramme, which critiques the whole voyeuristic 
technique as masculinist. 
Devlin: Transformation o r  Resistance 197 
occas10n, harassed both distributors and exhibitors, as well as 
perpetrating organized vandalism. 
Legally, feminists have been creative in developing common law and 
statutory policies to both protect women and to try to hit the pornocrats 
where it hurts. On the criminal plane, there have been calls for more 
rigorous enforcement of laws on (sexual) assault and battering against 
both the makers of pornography and men who live out their 
pornographic desires on women. There have been arguments favouring 
an expanded conception of obscenity so as to incorporate the feminist 
interpretation of pornography, with limited success.336 It has been 
suggested that there be amendments to the hate literature provisions of 
the Canadian Criminal Code so as to incorporate pornography337 and 
that pornographers b� prosecuted under prostitution statutes. 338 There has 
been support, although qualified by some strong reservations, for new 
anti-pornography legislation recently introduced by the current Canadian 
administration, i.e. Bill C-54.339 
In the United States there has been feminist support for zoning 
regulations, 340 and the use of public nuisance statutes in an attempt to 
minimize access to the impact of pornography.341 Tort law has presented 
336. C. Jacobs, "Patterns of Violence", supra note 305; Kathleen Mahoney, "Obscenity, 
Morals and Law", supra note 303; Sheila Noonan, "Pornography" (1985), 45 C.R. (3d) 61. 
A judicial propensity to adopt such an approach has manifested itself in several Canadian 
cases: R. v. Chin (unreported, Ont. Provincial Ct. 22nd Feb. 1983); R. v. Doug Rankine Co. 
Ltd (1983), 36 C.R. (3d) 154; 9 C.C.C. (3d) 53 (Ont. Co. Ct.); R. v. Ramsingh (1984), 14 
C.C.C. (3d) 230 (Man. Q.B.) Ferg. J.; R. v. W(zgner ( l985), 43 C.R. (3d) 318, 36 Alta. L.Rev. 
(2d) 301 (Q. B.) Shannon J.; R. v. Red Hot Video (1985), 45 C.R. (3d) 36 ( B.C.C.A.) Nemetz 
C.J. B.C.; Towne Cinema Theatres v. R., supra note 430. 
337. Toronto Area Caucus of Women and the Law, 1984 Recommendations for the 
Amendment of the Criminal Code, i.e. s. 159. For a discussion and proposed text see K. Lahey, 
"Charter and Pornography", supra note 305 at 666. 
338. L.D. Hutchins, "Pornography: The Prosecution of Pornographers Under Prostitution 
Statutes - A  New Approach" (1986-87), 37 Syracuse L.Rev. 977. 
339. See supra note 305. 
340. C. Jacobs, supra note 305. See e.g., Euclid v. Amber Reality Co. 272 U.S. 365 (1926); 
Young v. American Mini Theatres 427 U.S. 50 (1976); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres 
106 S. Ct. 925 (1986). See also Note "Constitutional Law - First Amendment - Zoning 
Prohibition", 12 Seton Hall 311 (1981-82). At the municipal level in Canada there has been 
a proliferation of by-laws which attempt to regulate obscene material through zoning 
requirements and by direct regulating the sale of obscene material. For a listing of some of the 
relevant municipal by-laws, see Mahoney, "Obscenity and Public Policy" (1986), 50 Sask. 
L.Rev. 75, 100 n 132. Some cases that discuss the operation of these varied by-laws are Red 
Hot Video Ltd v. City of Vancouver (1985), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 153 ( B.C.C.A.); Re Information 
Retailers Association (1985), 22 D.L.Rev. (4th) 161 (Ont. C.A.); Re Hamilton Independent 
Variety (1983), 143 D.L.Rev. (3rd) 498 (Ont. C.A.); Re Sha/mark Hotels (1981), 32 O.R. 
(2d) 129 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Re Nordee Investments (1984), 48 O.R. (2d) 123 (Ont. C.A.). 
341. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985). See C. Jacobs, supra note 305 at 
48-51. L.D. Hutchins, supra note 338 at 981-983; "Colloquium on Violent Pornography", 
supra note 316 at 197; Note, "Enjoying Obscenity as a Public Nuisance and the Prior Restraint 
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itself as a potentially rich source of legal remedies including actions based 
upon infringement of women's privacy,342 mental distress,343 private 
nuisance, unauthorized sexual portrayals,344 and the controversial anti­
pornography ordinances developed by Andrea Dworkin arid Catharine 
A. MacKinnon. 345 There has also been the related claim that 
pornography infringes Canadian provincial human rights codes.346 It 
seems to me that such activities are a tangible manifestation of the "ethic 
of care" in practice, a significant effort "to apprehend the reality of the 
other", and to act upon it. 
IV. Feminism and the Turn to Law: Part of the Problem, Part of the 
Solution 
Sometimes you become what you are fighting. 
Catharine MacKinnon347 
[ while it is] unpleasant to be locked out . . . it is worse, perhaps, to be 
locked in 
Virginia Wolf348 
Pornography has backed women into a corner: through its integral 
connection with violence it is a threat to the health, safety and even 
existence of women.349 Women, if they are to protect themselves from 
Doctrine" (1984), 84 Col. L.Rev. 1616; "Regulation of Obscenity through Nuisance Statutes" 
(1983), 19 Wake Forest L.Rev. 1·; "Pornography, Padlocks and Prior Restraints" (1983), 58 
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1478; Bendleman, "Civilizing Pornography, The Case for an Exclusive 
Obscenity Nuisance Statute" (1977), 44 U. Chic. L.Rev. 509; O'Connor, "Nuisance 
Abatement Law" (1977), 46 Fordham L.Rev. 57; Oglesby, "Porno non est pro bono publico" 
(1977), 4 Hastings Constit. L.Q. 385. 
342. Barbara S. Bryant, "Sexual Display of Women's Bodies - A Violation of Privacy" 
(1980), 10 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 1211; Ruth Colker, "Pornography and Privacy: Towards 
the Development of a Group Based Theory for Sex Based Intrusions of Privacy" (1983), 1 Law 
and Inequality 191. 
343. J. Bakan, supra note 305. 
344. Ruth Colker, "Regulation of Unauthorized Sexual Portrayals" (1986-87), 20 New 
England L.Rev. 687. 
345. Anti-Pornography Ordinances, supra note 332. Some Canadian Feminists also support 
such measures. See "AGM Rejects New Porn Bill" (1987), 2 Feminist Action 7. 
346. Sask. Human Rights Comm. v. Waldo (1985), 5 Can. Human Rights Rep. 17609-17783 
or 2074. 
347. Feminism Unmodified at 91. 
348. A Room of Ones Own cited in Showalter "Feminist Criticism in the Wilderness" (1981-
82), 8 Critical Inquiry 179, 181. 
349. The Amicus Curiae Brief - Linda Marchiano and Estate of Dorothy Stratten at 18-19, 
Hudnut v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Docket No. 84-3147 (7th Cir. 1985) cites studies 
which show that between one-fifth and one-third of all women reported some sort of 
childhood sexual encounter with an adult male, that forty-four percent of all women had 
reported an attempted or completed rape in their lives, that twenty-one percent of wo�en who 
had ever been married reported physical violence by a husband. MacKinnon stresses that these 
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these atrocities, to survive, must do something about it.350 There is no 
alternative . . .  it is a matter of life and death. Feminism as the voice and 
practice of womankind must respond. It cannot abandon women to the 
pornographers, 351 the rapists, the batterers. 352 
The question is how.353 It is at this exact point that the anguishing 
dilemma between theory and practice, vision and need, aspiration and 
immediacy comes into sharp relief. Political necessity dictates do 
whatever is possible to protect women, and the law presents itself as a 
potentially important arena for self-defence. Yet, at the same time, a 
consciousness of the violence that is inscribed within the very idea and 
practice of contemporary law itself may make resort to law problematic, 
perhaps even antithetical to a movement that considers the ethic of care 
to be an important fa�t of its agenda. 
From the earliest days of the women's movement, struggle in the legal 
arena has been a central component of feminist practice. Recognizing 
that law is a constitutive element of the polity, feminists have sought to 
make the law more responsive to womens' needs by gaining access to 
their own property, achieving suffrage, having their reproductive 
autonomy at least partially recognized, sponsoring changes to rape laws, 
lobbying for pay equity, and litigation through the highest courts in the 
land. Furthermore, Canadian feminists have achieved what the E.R.A. 
movement failed to do: they have had equality provisions enshrined to 
the Constitution. 
Clearly these achievements have not resulted in substantive equality or 
anything like it, but what they do suggest is that the legal system is 
flexible enough to respond to women's needs, that progress - in the 
liberal sense of the word - is being made by women. They suggest that 
women and feminists are gradually gaining access to the corridors of 
traditional power, that their demands are being heard, and even acted 
upon, and that law is a worthwhile arena for social and political activity 
for women. In the light of such a long history of exclusion, 
statistics reflect only reported abuse, and that substantial amounts of sexual and domestic 
violence are generally agreed to go unreported. 
She argues, 
Pornography is at the centre of a cycle of abuse that cannot be reached or stopped 
without reaching or stopping the pornography that is its incentive, product, stimulus 
and realization, 
"Pornography as Sex Discrimination" supra note 314 at 48. 
350. So also, must socially conscious and politically responsible men. 
351. Lahey "Charter and Pornography", supra note 301 at 671. 
352. MacKinnon, "Agenda", supra note 146. 
353. As Marilyn French points out, "the major problem facing feminists can be easily summed 
up: there is no clear right way to move". Beyond Power at 484. 
200 The Dalhousie Law Journal 
marginalization and subordination, such victories are undoubtedly 
encouraging, even exhilarating. Thus, when pornography -becomes a 
concern for feminists it is inevitable that the quest for legal remedies 
should become one of the central components of the feminist 
programme. 
The history of feminist jurisprudence, although covering a much 
shorter time span, broadly maps the development of the feminist legal 
agenda. Some of the earliest examples of feminist jurisprudence criticised 
the exclusion of women and issues which were of particular concern to 
women, from both the law and jurisprudential reflections on the legal 
system, while simultaneously highlighting the pervasive male biases and 
assumptions.354 This "first wave" was followed by what might be 
described as a _"demand for access" scholarship, a filling in of the gaps so 
as to render the legal system more fair. 355 
A third wave in feminist legal scholarship suggested that the second 
approach was inadequate in that it did not adequately comprehend the 
deep structural embeddedness of androcentricity in law, and therefore its 
ability to resist feminist input. 356 This approach suggested that the 
feminist critique and reconstruction of law would have to be even more 
ambitious, and difficult, than had hitherto been realized. It highlighted the 
epistemologically gendered nature of law itself, that law is a vital part of 
the power/knowledge/ideology matrix that structures our lived 
experiences. For example, Catharine MacKinnon's critique of traditional 
rape law poignantly highlights the way in which the "neutrality" and 
"objectivity" of that law is, in reality, premised upon a deeply entrenched 
male viewpoint, that is, the viewpoint of the rapist or potential rapist, and 
not women, the victims of rape. She argues that if we were to seriously 
consider and adopt an understanding of rape that reflects women's 
·understanding of rape, then the law would be very different.357 
While I do not wish to cast doubt on the- significance of these 
achievements of feminist practice or theory, nor denigrate their 
importance, I think that a critical jurisprudence must continue to push 
forward and point out their potential limitations, and possible dangers. In 
the spirit of the feminist dynamic already traced in this paper, there must 
354. See for example J. Ritkin, "Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy" (1980), 3 Harv. 
W.L. J. 83; D. Polan. "Towards a Theory of Law and Patriarchy"; N. Taub and E. Schneider, 
"Perspectives on Womens Subordination and the Role of Law" in Kairys, The Politics of Law 
12 & 4 & 3 (1983). 
355. W. Chafe, Women and Equality (1977). For a review and assessment of the theory and 
practice of such perspectives, see Olsen, supra note 8 at 1529-1560. 
356. See e.g. Olsen, The Sex of Law, (unpublished manuscript, 1984). 
357. MacKinnon, "Feminist Jurisprudence", supra note 209. 
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be a continual critical consciousness of the pervasiveness of andocentrism 
at every level, with the correlative progressive imperative "to question 
everything". I will concentrate my reflections first on the theoretical end 
of the spectrum, and then return to a discussion of the legal remedies 
proposed by anti-pornography activists. 
I am concerned that the feminist emphasis on unpacking the deep 
structural ideological assumptions of law - the sex of law - has, 
perhaps, led to the under-emphasis on the "how of law". By the "how of 
law" I mean the way in which law is made material or relevant in a 
community, the operational norms of law. The feminist analysis of the 
ideological significance of law is crucial, but feminism must also be 
careful to remain conscious that law is more than an ideology, that it is 
"operationalized" in very specific ways, that contemporary law is a vital 
mechanism of sociaf control and political domination. As I have 
suggested in Part A of this essay, it is the subtle interplay of violence and 
ideology, not their disjunction, that accounts for the genius of law. 
Consequently, if violence is an androcentric quality,358 or the product of 
a male dominated society unable to reconcile the tension between "self' 
and "other", then the bias of law may be even more deeply embedded 
than even the most progressive feminist insights have already uncovered. 
The feminist critique and reconstruction must, therefore, not only unravel 
and rework the politically partisan nature of law, it must develop visions 
of the very operation of law itself, and confront the problematic 
relationship between care, control and coercion. A feminist jurisprudence 
must invoke its critical ability to take a "double look"359 at law, for the 
patriarchal unconscious may be even more deeply entrenched than we 
have yet understood. 360 
To elaborate, it is not simply the instrumental problem of how to make 
traditionally sexist laws, legal institutions and legal actors respond to the 
needs of women, although this is important, but the more fundamental 
dilemma of maintaining feminist visions and aspirations while at the 
same time moving from "here" to "there". Put differently, if the purpose 
358. S. Brownmiller, Against Our Wills ( 1975). 
359. See for example, Peggy MacIntosh, "Feeling Like a Fraud" (1985) (unpublished 
manuscript, Wellesley College) for a fruitful discussion of feminist's ability to critically "double 
vision" concepts, ideologies and practices; 
We need a double vision [double consciousness] both of what the dominant culture 
stands for and what we lower caste people who are undervalued can develop in the way 
of a critique of the dominant culture, Ibid., at 8 and 15. 
360. I should point out that my aim is not to further impose burdens on those who are already 
denied equality, to make their life even more oppressive and demanding. I also believe that 
men should be incorporating -the ethic of care in their law-making, my point here is to ask "at 
what price access" and "on whose terms?" 
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of feminism is, at least in part, to challenge domination,361 to create a 
society founded upon and structured by desiderata such as the 
preservation of relations, "the ability to apprehend the reality of 
others",362 a rejection of violence and the avoidance of harm363 then 
recourse to contemporary law, and all the violent baggage and 
underpinnings that go along with it, 364 appears to contradict the long term 
goal, perhaps "recreat(ing) the patterns of oppression that feminism arose 
to combat".365 Even if law is a powerful political tool, feminists must 
confront the difficult and profoundly disturbing question of whether they 
are, at bottom, merely substituting an agenda that is itself lamentably 
imbricated with violence for that of a male agenda, and not a feminist 
reconstruction of law. Would it be a feminist mimicry of male discourse 
and practice, not a transformative alternative? Does it run the risk of 
being a capit.ulation to, not a rejection of, patriarchal lore, lure and 
law?366 Contemporary law, understood simply as an instrument of social 
engineering,367 may be an anathema to some of the basic tenets of 
feminism. Legal fetishism may be more deeply entrenched in the popular 
and legal psyches than we had ever imagined or feared. 368 
361. Scales, supra note 179 at 1382; Sheila Rowbotham, Woman's Estate (1973); Mary Daly, 
Beyond God the Father (1973). 
362. Jean Grimshaw, Ch. 7, supra note 44. 
363. See, J.D. Wine, Hughes and Finn in Feminism in Canada, supra note 14 at 83, 287 and 
306; Ruth Colker, "Consciousness and Love: Towards a Feminist-Theological Discourse" 51 
(1988) (unpublished manuscript); Gilligan, Voice passim. 
364. MacKinnon is aware of this in her earlier work. "The law sees and treats women in the 
way men see and treat women. The liberal state coercively and authoritatively constitutes the 
social order in the interest of men as a gender, through its legitimizing norms, relation to 
society, the substantive policies." "Feminist Jurisprudence", supra note 209 at 644 [emphasis 
added.] However, like most critical legal scholars, she tends to emphasize the ideological 
significance of law - in this case embedded maleness - at the expense of the coercive/violent 
aspects. Consequently, her transformative vision is pitched at the ideological level, which is no 
doubt crucial, but again partial. 
365. Ferguson, supra note 43 at 203. 
366. Sandra Gilbert, Introduction to Newly Born Woman at xi. 
367. See for example, Ann Scales, "Feminist Jurisprudence", supra note 179; Elizabeth 
Schneider, "The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: (1986), 61 New York U.L.Rev. 589; 
MacKinnon, "Discourse", at 72. 
368. By attempting to highlight embeddedness of violence of law and the potential 
connections with patriarchy, I am here attempting to continue the feminist project of 
consciousness-raising, to illuminate the structures of domination as they exist both externally 
and internally, consciously and unconsciously. See further MacKinnon, "Agenda" supra note 
146 at 519-520. 
Again, in light of the feminist emphasis of contextualism, I think it is appropriate to 
remember who is speaking when we discuss legal remedies. We are lawyers. Despite our 
counterhegemonic aspirations, our radicalism and our feminism, we are also lawyers who 
conceive of the world through a legalistic grid and who incorporate that perspective in 
everything we do, even if, as MacKinnon says, "we are feminists first". I fear that law and legal 
discourse are magnetic and imperialistic, colonizing our creative imaginations and constraining 
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Nor can these dilemmas be resolved by attempting to distinguish 
between means and ends, 369 because, as history demonstrates, once one 
begins to adopt a certain methodology that has an ineluctable impact on 
the consequences. Means and ends, methods and outcomes, processes 
and goals coexist in a symbiotic relationship. As Cheryl Cohen comments 
in the context of "sexuality", 
I think a political movement that uses any means to its end is doomed to 
achieve an undesirable end. A feminist political praxis that uses any means 
to tear down patriarchy may find that the practices it advocates ultimately 
construct the personalities of the next generations. If feminists advocate 
sexual practices which, when removed from a context of caring, can 
become objectifying and dehumanizing, they may thereby be responsible 
for an experimentalism with desire that sets not limits and gives no 
guidelines for constructive and healthy relations between persons. They 
may succeed in escaping from patriarchal constructions of sexuality, but 
they may also thereby destroy the human caring and responsibility that 
give us hope for a better world. I think ethics is essential to all politics but 
particularly in the traumatic transition to an unknown future.370 
We can concretize and contextualize these reflections through a brief 
review of some of the legal strategies suggested by feminists to .deal with 
pornography. Proposals grounded in the criminal law sanction are the 
most obviously problematic in so far as there is a clear invocation of the 
repressive and punitive powers of the state, in support of feminist's 
preferred agenda. The feminist challenge only goes so far as to change the 
object of state imposed violence, not the nature of law itself. As such, it 
reflects the concerns of the "demand for access approach", the "second 
wave" of feminist jurisprudence. 
Do the civil law remedies, those which are tortious or human rights 
based, avoid this same problem? Do they attempt something that is more 
transgressive or transformative? An analysis of the anti-pornography 
ordinances may prove to be particularly useful at this point. 
our emancipatory potentials by the shackles of seeking solutions to politico-social problems 
through law. I am frightened by the thought that the pervasiveness of legal ideology may be 
so deeply engrained that nothing seems possible without the invocation of its sanctifing blessing 
through violence. Equalitarianism, if prioritized, may result in "an equality of 
dehumanization". (Herbert Marcuse, Counter-Revolution and Revolt 75 (1972)). 
Similar concerns about the tension-ridden relationship between feminism and legalism, 
particularly as "legalist loyalties" may tend to trump the feminist methodology of 
consciousness-raising, have been voiced by Robin West, "Hedonic Lives", supra note 164 at 
44-45. 
369. For a critique of means and ends thinking as malist alienating dichotomies, see A. Miles, 
"l.F.P.", supra note 21 at 482, "IF", ibid. at 59-60. 
370. "The Feminist Sexuality Debate: Ethics and Politics" (1986), 2 Hypatia 71 ,  84-85; see 
also, Grimshaw, supra note 44 at 214-221; Steinham, "Feminist Ethic", ibid. at 62. 
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Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, encouraged by the 
admittedly limited successes of judicial response to actions based upon 
sexual harrassment, have developed the anti-pornography ordinance that 
would allow women to pursue civil remedies against the pornocrats. In 
so far as such an approach does not invoke the criminal law remedy it 
does not call on the coercive power of the state. Indeed, MacKinnon sees 
this argument as being the main reason why the ordinance is neither 
prior-restraint nor censorship. She is at pains to point out that the 
ordinance is different from obscenity legislation.371 Moreover, the 
ordinances attempt to rework the evaluative criteria of law in so far as 
they attempt to materialize in legal terms the harmful significance which 
women attach to pornography. Viewed in this light, such proposals 
encompass s�me of the concerns of. the "third wave" of feminist 
jurisprudence. 
However, despite the important step forward that such ordinances 
achieve, they still fail to come to terms with the concern of what might 
be called the "fourth wave" of feminist jurisprudence, the inquiry into the 
way in which legal norms are operationalized. MacKinnon has, on many 
occasions, reiterated the claim that the ordinances do not invoke the 
power of the state, rather they empower women. However, such a 
dichotomous view is difficult to maintain, and cannot be justified on the 
basis of the formalistic distinction between civil and criminal law. The 
ordinances were lobbied for and achieved or defeated through statist fora, 
municip�l governments and/ or courts. Although the plaintiff in cases is 
intended to be a private person, the channels through which the action 
must go - human rights commissions, courts - are statist institutions.372 
The process of empowering women, therefore, does not take place in the 
absence of the state, but rather through the state. 
This attempt to highlight the continued influence of the state should 
not be interpreted as being libertarian or anti-statist, for the state must be 
central in any project of transformation. Rather, it is simply a reminder 
371. See e.g. Feminist Unmodified at 140. 
372. More recently MacKinnon has withdrawn from her earlier view that the ordinances do 
not empower the state to admit, "It does not empower the state in the direct way that an 
obscenity law does" "Discourse", at 34. The key word here, of course, is "direct", and again, 
later, she posits that "we have the audacity to think that we might be able to use the state to 
help (empower women)". Ibid. at 72. Thus MacKinnon's concerns about the state are very 
different than my own. Her main concern is emphasizing the non-statist nature of the 
legislation is to distinguish the ordinance so as not to be open to accusations of prior restraint, 
censorship or the danger of the legislation backfiring. She does not deal with the concern of the 
violence of law. On the contrary, on one occasion she suggests that it may be "worth 
considering" the use of the United States federal criminal law power, in appropriate 
circumstances. "Speech", supra note 30 I at 61 ,  footnote 44. 
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that so pervasive and multifaceted is the structure of the state in post­
industrial, patriarchal society that is difficult to evade its influence. My 
main point is narrower, however. The reason why civil law remedies -
specific performance or damages - are attractive in the first place is 
because they might just be enforced against the producers or consumers 
of pornography. But the enforcement of civil remedies is completely 
dependent upon the coercive apparatus of state, in the same way as the 
criminal law power. Consequently, the ordinances, although innovative 
and creative, are also overdetermined by the threat and potential 
actualization of violence and, in their own way, although perhaps at a 
later stage, reinforce women's dependency on the normalization of 
violence. The cycle is difficult to break. 
None of this is to say that feminism is internally debarred from 
recourse to law in all circumstances. I am not so utopian or naive as to 
believe that by avoiding or ignoring law it will simply wither away, or 
that recourse to law is not a necessary step in any political movement. I 
am neither advocating an abandonment of law nor "counselling 
abdication of the state altogether":373 Nor am I saying that women should 
not use violence to defend themselves against male violence.374 Rather, I 
am suggesting that feminists be very wary of the seeming potential of law 
for it is also quicksand that could silently but effectively bury the 
emancipatory impulse that motivates so much of feminism. Rephrased, if 
the ethic of care is a constitutive element of contemporary feminism, its 
"injunction not to hurt others" would suggest that there is a prima facie 
presumption against legal remedies, while the burden of proof is on those 
who support legal remedies to demonstrate that the returns are worth the 
risk,375 
373. A stance which MacKinnon ascribes to Marxism in "Feminist Jurisprudence", supra 
note 209 at 643. 
374. MacKinnon once asked, "Don't they want us to learn how to kill?" in "Women Who 
Kill" (1983), 34 Stanford L.Rev. at 732. 
Although I am no pacifist, I would certainly prefer if people did not know how to kill. 
Having said that, and to be more gender specific, I think that there clearly are circumstances 
in which it may be appropriate for women to do violence to men, and even kill them. The 
obvious example is women who are subject to seriously abusive relationships. And I think that 
it is appropriate for feminists to defend these women from the prosecutorial violence of the 
state. My objection is to the uncritical reinforcement of the violence of modern law. Direct 
action by women is less of a problem for me because, like abortions, such actions are hardly 
taken lightly, and is unlike the violence of the law which, as. Cover has pointed out, is 
structured so as to minimize our resistence to violence. 
375. By risk I mean several different things. First there is risk articulated in this paper, the risk 
of foregoing an important aspect of the feminist vision. Second there is the political risk that 
such legislation will backfire, hurting the women's movement rather than helping it. Third, 
there is the risk that strategies of legal regulation may be unduly divisive of the women's 
movement at the expense of a strategy the precedents for which are hardly encouraging. 
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I am not saying that feminists should not pursue legal remedies to the 
problem of pornography. That would be to say too much, it would be too 
judgemental, too authoritarian, too despotic. I do not "know" what 
feminists know; pornography does not, cannot, impact my life the way it 
does womens' lives. 'But it seems to me that the question posed by 
pornography and the appropriate feminist response creates a moment of 
"crisis and transition"376 for feminist theory and praxis. In their attempts 
to effectively deal with the pornographic assault, feminists may take the 
opportunity to respond in ways that are innovative and transgressive, 
motivated by an awareness of interconnectedness and inspired by an 
ethic of care that continues to "apprehend the reality of the other".377 Or, 
feminists may take recourse to "the cycle of repetition that has extended 
across generations a cold loneliness"378 concretized in the impersonalized 
corpus of a determinatively repressive law. That choice is one that must 
be made by women and feminists, as a community, not by another. 
V) Conclusion 
To be without a conclusion or destination, is not, however, to be without 
purpose. 
Elizabeth Meese379 
It has been widely recognized that, even taken in their best light, women's progress through 
law has been a "mixed bag" and even reactionary. MacKinnon herself is acutely conscious of 
the paucity of success in achieving equality through legal remedies. 
The abortion right, framed as a right to privacy rather than a right to sex equality, was 
recognized, only to be taken almost immediately from women who have least access to 
it . . .  women are poor and their pay is at least as far from being sex-equal as it was 
before the passage of legislation guaranteeing pay equality by law. Women are more 
and more losing custody of their children, in part because of legal reforms feminists 
helped put in place. The rape rate is increasing significantly, while the conviction rate 
for rape is not, in spite of legal changes feminists fought for and won over the last 
decade . . . .  
Feminism Unmodified at 1 (footnotes omitted). 
376. Gilligan, Voice, ch. 4. 
377. I would attach one important proviso to my concerns. As should be clear my primary 
concern is law's disregard of our common humanity as persons. If law is used against non­
humans, "legal persons" as we rather euphemistically call "corporations", then many of my 
concerns are less important. Corporations are not sentient, and within my value structure are 
less important than people. But again, that should not be interpreted carte b/anche, a 
formalistic approach cannot be adopted. Many corporate bodies are simply real persons 
acknowledged to have a particular legal status. Others are large empires distinct from the 
people who stand behind them. I am more comfortable if the contextual approach is adopted, 
to distinguish between those who could be subject to the violence of law, and those who should 
not. 
378. Voice, at 107. 
379. Crossing the Double-Cross: The Practice of Feminist Criticism (1987) at xii. 
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Imagination: . . . "not merely for changing institutions but for human 
relationships; not merely for equal rights, but for a new kind of beint' 
Adrienne Rich380 
I have covered a great deal of ground in this essay. Through a discussion 
of subjugated knowledges, in the spirit of a jurisprudential archeological 
dig, and motivated by the feminist preference for transdisciplinary 
research and reflection, I have attempted to unearth at least one of the 
foundations of our received jurisprudential tradition. The exposition of 
law's antifactual nature, in turn, opened up an interrogative space in 
which to investigate some hitherto unquestioned assumptions that 
provide the mortar for the edifice. Through an extensive discussion of 
some of the tensions of contemporary feminism, I suggested the 
possibility of an alternative juridical construct, one that transcends and 
displaces the thanaticai impulse that has underpinned patriarchal society 
and plagued the dominant jurisprudential tradition. But I do not offer a 
tidy conclusion, for the invocation of closure usually obscures and 
excludes more than it enlightens or resolves.381 Moreover, the centrality 
which feminism and modernism afford to openness sits uncomfortably 
with the traditional legal quest for right answers. 
However, in order to be as clear as possible, it may be useful if I 
attempt to forestall some possible misinterpretations. For many women, 
and perhaps some men, this paper may be problematic, accommodating, 
deradicalizing, condescending, arrogant, offensive, or perhaps even 
insulting. Some may understand it as setting up feminism as either 
glorificationally redemptive or vindictively retributive, a jurisprudential 
twist to the madonna/whore stereotype, or the double-standard, yet 
again. Others may interpret my support of the ethic of care as an attempt 
to modernize the "cult of pure womanhood"382 or as hopelessly 
sentimentalized, romantic or naive. Some may interpret it as the product 
of the "abstract refuges of academia", turning "women into a field or an 
idea or a subspeciality, an artifact of one theoretical approach or 
another".383 It may well be construed as a "magical approach to social 
change . . .  (a) 'let's pretend' strategy (that) is idealist and elitist both".384 
Others, less benignly, may see it as the blame-the-victim strategy, thinly 
380. In "Toward a Woman Centred University" Lies Secrets and Silence (1979) at 125 at 
155. 
38 I .  Barbara Johnston, The Critical Diference ( 1981 ). 
382. Barbara Berg, The Remembered Gate ( 1979). 
383. Feminism Unmodified at 216. 
384. Feminism Unmodified at 219. 
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disguised.385 At the bottom such responses are probably based in a belief 
that the article and myself manifest "virtually no commitment to 
change"386 caught up in a "conception of politics as fantasy and 
entertainment".387 Others may characterize my reflections as either 
oblivious to, or trivializing of, the oppression of women, an effort to deny 
them recourse to one of the few remedies they may have available to 
challenge patriarchy. 
I want to resist such criticisms. The purpose of this paper is not 
negation, rather it is an attempt to contribute to the feminist demand for 
constant conversation388 from the perspective of what might be called a · 
"feminist-positive"389 male. As the celtic triptych in Part A might suggest, 
my commitment to change is fundamental, and it is that which leads me 
to ask the qu�tions I have asked, posit the dilemmas I have posed, and 
suggest the suggestions I have made.390 Emphatically, to problematize is 
not to stymie. Rather, it is to continue the feminist critical dynamic, to 
locate and challenge patriarchy and domination in all their forms and to 
raise the possibility of their transcendence. This is not masculinist 
ventriloquism. I am not speaking for women. I am attempting to speak 
with women about opportunities, aspirations and visions which some 
have claimed to be a central component of their agenda. My question 
asks whether the legal tools, unless radically refurbished, can deconstruct 
the master's house?391 I suggest that law can be a vital terrain in the 
process of emancipating women, but only if remade in a fundamentally 
different way. Like a magnet in a force field I am drawn towards the 
practical suggestions that MacKinnon and other feminists have made in 
an effort to access the tools of law; yet, simultaneously, law appears to 
stay the same, except that the constituency has changed. 392 Such a 
385. Another variation may be, "why experiment on the most vulnerable?" See Minow, "Part 
of the Solution, Part of the Problem" Review, J. Handler, The Conditions of Discretion ( 1986), 
34 U.C.L.A. Law Rev. 981, 1000. 
386. Feminism Unmodified at 216. 
387. Feminism Unmodified at 221. 
388. Editorial (1987), 12 Signs 619, 620. 
389. Sean Mullarkey, "Can a Man Be a Feminist" (Paper for "Legal Status Based on Sex", 
Dalhousie University) (Spring 1988). 
390. Without slipping into the danger of believing that thinking is doing, Karl Barth posits 
that, "transformation of thought is the key to the problem of ethics, for it is the place where 
the turning about takes place by which [we] are directed to new behaviour". The Epistle to the 
Romans 438 (1933). 
391. Andre Lorde, "The Master's Tools" supra note 206. 
392. As Robin West says in a different context, 
We must begin to make good on our promise to change the discourse with our 
presence, instead of simply changing ourselves to fit the discourse. 
"Hedonic Lives" supra note 164 at 10. 
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viewpoint, I think, comes dangerously close to seeing the law as neutral 
and capturable, if only the right strategies could be developed. It reminds 
me of legal realism's aspirations for social engineering through law. As 
such, it ignores the traditions, values, and elements imbricated within the 
very structure of contemporary law, a central value being violence.393 The 
critique and renovation envisioned by such a practice are partial rather 
than transformative, perhaps even more of the same. Traditional power 
not only corrupts, it deradicalizes alternative power structures. Feminism 
does provide a unique opportunity for the actual reconstitution of law, 
not just its reworking. Speculation, imagination and hope, on their own, 
cannot make things otherwise, but without them it is difficult to know 
where to go. 
My fear is that it. may be possible to detect a pincer movement 
confronting feminism. If it is true that pornography's proliferation and 
increasing violence is due, in part, to a reaction against feminism, 394 then 
feminism's attempt to take refuge in and seek remedies through the law 
may be reinforcing the modus operandi of patriarchal society rather than 
393. On occasion, MacKinnon does explicitly articulate concerns about the nature of law, but 
once again her comments are underdeveloped, and do not fit with the more instrumentalist 
approach which characterizes most of Feminism Unmodified. For example, 
The law - like the hunt, warfare and religion - has been a male sphere. The qualities 
and values of these pursuits have defined the male role and public life. They have 
defined what power means. [Feminism Unmodified at 26.] 
She continues, 
The feminist question for the future of women's rights is: if we acquire and use these 
forms of power, including economics (the modern equivalent of the hunt), the use of 
physical force ( of which war is a form), and the tools of law (the secular religion) will 
we use them differently. [Feminism Unmodified at 26.] 
This comment is important, I think. MacKinnon draws the analogy between religion and 
law rather than force and law. This suggests that MacKinnon understands law more in the 
context of its educative, ideological manifestations, rather than its coercive elements. This 
interpretation that MacKinnon primarily understands law as ideological is reinforced later 
when she discusses the educative effect of law in relation to pornography. [Feminism 
Unmodified at 131, 223.] 
This view is problematic. It is insufficiently cognizant of the coercive role of law, with its 
built-in hierarchy, domination and subordination. It ignores the possibility that although the 
ideological function of law may be dominant, its coercive function is determinative. Law 
certainly does educate, but it is an education reinforced by violence, or the threat of violence, 
an education based on fear, terror. Remember Plato. In turning to the la.w to fight hierarchy, 
there is a very real danger of simply replacing one hierarchical relationship with another, 
adding momentum to an already eschatological spiral. 
Only once in her most recent work does she recognize the fundamentally coercive nature of 
the law, when she opines, "law being a form of combat". [Feminism Unmodified at 75.] 
394. See for example, Dworkin, "Why So-Called Radical Men Love and Need Pornography" 
in Lederer, "Night" supra note 307, 148 at 153; Sally Wagner, "Pornography and the Sexual 
Revolution: The Backlash of Sadomasochism", Against Sadomasochism: A Radical Feminist 
Analysis 23 Linden, ed., (1982). 
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challenging it. Pathological pornography terrifies women, thereby 
limiting the feminist agenda to a politics of fear, rather than a politics of 
hope. Patriarchal society will only allow feminism a very limited defence 
mechanism, one which is circumscribed by a masculinist ideology. Thus 
between them, pornograpy and law, aggressor and defender, they encircle 
the radical transgressive potential of feminism, terrorize it and 
disempower it. By offering it as a potentially helpful defence mechanism, 
law - as it is currently constituted - may lead feminism to forgo too 
quickly its transformative, jurisgenerative potential, adopting a policy of 
resistance at the price of partial incorporation. 
